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Abstract

Enron has become a symbol: a symbol of excess, an illustration of how a
company can base its business on fraudulent, deceptive or even largely nonexistent business transactions. The collapse of Enron had a significant impact on
the adoption of legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was intended to
prevent the types of fraudulent behavior that occurred at Enron. However,
Sarbanes-Oxley and other responses to the business practices of many companies
during the late 1990s do not fully address some of the underlying factors that
permitted and in fact encouraged the Enrons of the world to represent their
companies in a particular fashion. Such legal interventions further do not
address underlying factors rooted in the fact that many companies now operate
within the context of knowledge economy intangibles paradigm business
practices. Current securities law disclosure frameworks are largely based on an
implicit assumption about the nature of companies’ business operations. Such
frameworks were developed during a time period in which the principal business
model was one based on the exploitation of tangible assets. Since the latter half
of the twentieth century and the advent of the knowledge economy or digital era,
an increasing number of companies have begun operating under businesses
models in which the predominant source of value comes from intangible
resources. As a result of this fundamental change in business models, an
intangibles “haze” has come to characterize the application of securities
disclosure and accounting rules. This intangibles haze has meant that securities
disclosures made by such companies, particularly as reflected in financial
statements such as balance sheets, increasingly do not reflect underlying
economic reality.

*

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law (Fall 2005); Assistant
Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. A.B. Harvard College, M.A., Ph.D.,
University of California, Berkeley (Anthropology); A.M. University of Michigan (Applied
Economics); J.D. Harvard Law School. Email: oba1@case.edu. For their helpful comments, I
am indebted to George Dent, Jonathan Entin, Jill Fisch, Nancy Kim, Andrew Morriss and
participants at workshops at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Northwestern University School of
Law. This article would not have been possible without the able research assistance of Justin
Morocco and Silja Bornschlegl.

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy
INTRODUCTION
I.

2
4

SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE
FLEXIBILITY OF COMPANY PRESENTATIONS
A. THE CHALLENGES AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF INTANGIBLES
B. DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING INTANGIBLES
C. SECURITIES DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND ACCOUNTING RULES
D. FINANCIAL STATEMENT PRESENTATIONS
1. Core Aspects of Financial Statement Presentations
2. Framing and Financial Statement Presentations under the
Intangibles Paradigm
E. SYNTHETIC LEASES AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT
TRANSFORMATIONS
1. The Structure and Magnitude of Synthetic Lease Transactions
2. Synthetic Leases, SPEs and Transforming Representations of
Economic Reality
F. INTANGIBLES AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

II. THE INTANGIBLES “PARADIGM”: THE CHANGING
CONTEXT OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT
A. ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
1. Tangibles paradigm Business Organization from an Historical
Perspective
2. Virtual Business Organization: The Case of Cisco
B. INTANGIBLES AND BUSINESS PRACTICE: THE USES OF INTANGIBLE
RESOURCES
1. The Role of Intangibles
2. The Market to Book Ratio: A Reflection of Intangibles?
C. PRESENTATION AND PERFORMANCE: COMPANY FRAMING CHOICES
AND AUDIENCE IMPRESSIONS
1. Dramaturgical Aspects of Company Presentations
2. Variations in Performance: The Implications of Presentation
Choices
D. A NEW BUSINESS PARADIGM: BUSINESS WORLDVIEW AND
PRACTICE UNDER THE INTANGIBLES PARADIGM
1. The Intangibles Paradigm Shift
a. Paradigm Shifts from a Kuhnian Perspective
b. The Metaphysical and Sociological Aspects of the Intangibles
Paradigm
c. Business Representations, Corporate Documents and the
Intangibles Paradigm
2. Intangibles Paradigm Discourse: Strategic Behavior and the

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

7
7
11
13
16
16
18
21
21
24
25
27
27
27
30
33
33
34
39
39
41
45
45
45
46
49

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy
Strategic Intellectual Property Management Literature
a. Intangibles, Strategic Behaviors and Business Transformations
b. Intangibles Paradigm Discourse and Practice at Enron
III. THE INTANGIBLES “HAZE”: MEASURING AND DESCRIBING
INTANGIBLES
A. CAPITAL ASSET OR CURRENT EXPENSE?: DIFFERENTIAL
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLES
B. ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION: DISCLOSURE AND
DECISION MAKING UNDER THE INTANGIBLES PARADIGM
C. VERIFIABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE INTANGIBLES
PARADIGM: THE USEFULNESS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
IV. INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE:
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTANGIBLES HAZE
A. THE INTANGIBLES PARADIGM AND MANAGEMENT OF EARNINGS
1. The Intangibles Paradigm and Aggressive Accounting Practices
2. The Intangibles Paradigm and Fraud at Enron
B. INTEGRATING ICTS: THE WAL-MART DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
A. THE INTANGIBLES HAZE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
B. INCORPORATING INTANGIBLES IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
MEASURING THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF INTANGIBLES
C. INTANGIBLES SECURITIES DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK: SECURITIES
REGULATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
CONCLUSION

3
51
51
53
56
56
60
64
66
67
67
70
75
77
78
79
82
85

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy

4

INTRODUCTION
In some ways the history of Enron reflects a standard story of corporate fraud and
malfeasance in which certain officers intentionally misrepresented the nature of
the company’s business and practices. This fraud was reflected in Enron’s
securities disclosure, including Enron financial statements. This version of the
Enron saga leaves out an important element of the broader business context within
which Enron operated. This aspect of the business context relates to the changing
nature and sources from which companies now derive value today. Another way
to read the Enron story is to consider the fact that companies today operate in a
post-industrial knowledge economy that is largely based on the use and
exploitation of intangible assets such as information technology, research and
development, brand equity and intellectual property rights.1 Existing securities
disclosure frameworks were developed in the context of companies that operated
under a tangible industrial business model in which tangible assets such as
property, plant and equipment were the predominant source of value. Current
securities disclosure frameworks and the accounting regimes incorporated within
such frameworks fail to address the full implications of this new intangibles
paradigm that is a key characteristic of knowledge economy business worldview
and practice. This failure represents an important and often omitted aspect of the
story of not only of Enron and other cases of corporate fraud in the late 1990s, but
more importantly of many corporations operating in today’s business
environment.
The history of Enron reflects an extreme example of the types of behaviors that
are made possible and even encouraged as a result of an accounting and
disclosure “haze” that currently surrounds intangibles.2 Enron’s public discourse
focused on presenting the company as at the forefront of the knowledge economy:
[W]e are participating in a new economy, and the rules have changed
dramatically. What you own is not as important as what you know. Hardwired businesses, such as energy and communications, have turned into
knowledge-based industries that place a premium on creativity. Enron has
been and always will be the consummate innovator because of our
1

ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS AND INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW
ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (2002) (“In the last few decades we have experienced what have
come to be called the ‘information age’ and the ‘knowledge economy’ . . . it is now
‘knowledge’—not labor, machines, land or natural resources—that is the key economic asset
drives long-run economic performance.”).
2
See Baruch Lev, Where Have All of Enron’s Intangibles Gone?, 21 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB.
POL’Y 131, 132 (2002) (discussing the role of intangibles at Enron).
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extraordinary people. It is our intellectual capital—not only our physical
assets—that makes us Enron.3
Although Enron aggressively advanced itself as a “new economy” knowledgebased company within the intangibles paradigm,4 the reality was quite different,
and Enron did not actually have many intangible assets. Enron’s required
securities disclosures, however, did not always clearly illustrate this fact, at least
partly because Enron was quite effective in taking advantage of the fact that
current securities disclosure and accounting requirements do not fully or
adequately address how companies should treat intangibles. This omission
facilitated Enron’s ability to present a fundamentally inaccurate representation of
the economic reality of its business and business operations. The ability of Enron
and other companies to represent economic reality in such an inaccurate fashion is
exacerbated by the mismatch between intangibles paradigm business practices
and tangibles paradigm regulatory standards.
Enron demonstrates one strategy that companies have used to emphasize the role
of intangibles in their business operations by means of what might be termed
intangibles paradigm discourse. Intangibles paradigm discourse may be
characterized as a manner of communication about intangibles such as
information technology and intellectual property that emphasizes the role of such
intangibles in business organization and practice.5 Through use of such discourse,
Enron took advantage of the lack of fit between disclosure requirements and
business practices. Enron and other companies have thus benefited from the fact
that current securities disclosure and accounting rules currently require only
limited disclosure with respect to intangibles.6
A significant commentary exists, in the accounting field in particular, concerning
the implications of intangibles for accounting frameworks.7 From a legal
perspective, much has been written concerning the link between recent cases of
corporate fraud and questionable accounting practices,8 as well as the implications
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for existing securities
3

Letter to Shareholders, Enron 1999 Annual Report 2 (2000) at
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/annual99/pdf.html.
4
See infra notes 123 to 258 and accompanying text for discussion of the intangibles paradigm.
5
See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying text for additional discussion concerning Enron’s
intangibles paradigm discourse.
6
See Baruch Lev, Sharpening the Intangibles Edge, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 109, 112 (June 2004)
(noting that GAAP does not require meaningful disclosure from companies about intangibles
investment except for aggregate research and development expenditures).
7
See infra notes 265 to 331 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., infra notes 33, 358, 363, 366, 382 and 404 and accompanying text.
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regulation frameworks.9 This Article seeks to mediate between these existing
discourses in the legal and accounting fields by drawing attention to the fact that a
fundamental paradigm shift in business organization and practice became
apparent in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although many of the
elements of this paradigm shift are at least implicitly recognized in some existing
accounting and legal commentary, this Article examines some of the specific
ways in which evidence of this paradigm shift is apparent as well as the effects of
this shift for business organization and practice.
This Article focuses on the fact that a common key element underlying issues
discussed by commentators from the legal and accounting fields is perceptible
changes in business organization and practices under the intangibles paradigm.
This changing business environment has facilitated the “creative” accounting
practices that came to typify the securities disclosure and accounting presentations
of many companies during the Internet boom of the late 1990s,10 and which may
have even facilitated fraud at companies such as Enron. These creative
accounting practices are facilitated by the current ways in which existing
regulatory structures have approached the intangibles paradigm. As a result, a
key element in confronting the reality of the intangibles paradigm will be the
development of regulatory structures that truly incorporate recognition and
understanding of the implications of the intangibles paradigm for actual business
practice.11
The implications of changing business practices for securities disclosure and
accounting frameworks are quite significant. Although accounting deals with
numbers, which seem fixed and determinate in the minds of many, accounting
decisions often involve both art and science and include choices about
9

See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747 (1985) (discussing the influence of information
technology on securities regulatory frameworks); Richard J. Miller & Michael R. Young,
Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1996
(1997) (noting that law has continued to develop to accommodate technological innovation); Paul
D. Cohen, Securities Trading via the Internet, 4 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (1999) (noting that
new technology requires new regulatory approaches); Daniel Everett Giddings, Comment, An
Innovative Link between the Internet, the Capital Markets, and the SEC: How the Internet Direct
Public Offering Helps Small Companies Looking to Raise Capital, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 788
(1998) (discussing Internet direct public offerings); Nancy C. Libin & James S. Wrona, The
Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable Match?, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 601, 602-04
(discussing the implications of the Internet for the securities industry); Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet
Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 69, 70
(1998), (noting that the Internet “offers new methods for offering and selling securities”).
10
See infra notes 334 to 345 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 388 to 421 and accompanying text.
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characterizations and framing that can be flexible.12 Part I of this Article focuses
on the operation of securities disclosure and accounting rules in contemporary
business contexts and the fact that companies often have and exercise choices
about how to frame and present financial and operational data. Part II discusses
the intangibles “paradigm” and moves to specific consideration of the relationship
between securities disclosure and accounting frameworks and business
organization, characteristics of the intangibles paradigm shift and the implications
of the intangibles paradigm for accounting systems and business practices. Part
III looks at the intangibles “haze” resulting from the intangibles paradigm. This
haze involves uncertainty about the extent to which accounting treatment of
intangibles adequately represents the underlying economic reality of business
practices and transactions under the intangibles paradigm and the potential
ramifications of such uncertainty. Part IV touches on additional legal issues,
including ones related to corporate governance in the intangibles paradigm. Part
V assesses the regulatory implications of the intangibles paradigms and makes
suggestions for how to incorporate better recognition of the intangibles paradigm
into existing regulatory structures.
I.

SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE FLEXIBILITY OF
COMPANY PRESENTATIONS

A.

The Challenges and Economic Importance of Intangibles

The intangibles haze is compounded by the ever increasing magnitude of
intangibles. Although the current magnitude of intangibles in the broader
economy is difficult to know with precision, one estimate suggests that at least 6
to 10 percent of United States gross domestic product is spent annually on
intangibles.13 Annual investment in intangibles has been estimated to be at least
12

See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 9 (2005)
(“[A]ccounting is an art, not a science. While lawyers may think of GAAP as a single set of rules
that must be followed, it is perhaps better to think of it as a set of standards that leave considerable
discretion for management and its accountants to choose the method of reporting some
transactions.”); DAVID F. HAWKINS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS: TEXTS
AND CASES v (3d ed. 1986) (“Today corporations have considerable leeway in how they report
their financial condition and results of operation. Despite recent progress in eliminating
undesirable reporting practices, many areas remain in which alternative practies are equally
acceptable for reporting essentially identical business situations. The profits of the reporting
company will vary depending on which alternative is used.”).
13
Leonard Nakamura, What is the U.S. Gross Investment in Intangibles? (At Least) One Trillion
Dollars a Year! 4 (Oct. 2001), Working Paper No. 01-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2001/wp01-15.pdf; M.M. Croes, Data for Intangibles in
Selected OECD Countries (Dec. 2000), Statistics Netherlands (comparing intangibles data in
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$1 trillion, with an estimated current equilibrium value of intangibles of more
than $5 trillion.14 This suggests that some one-third of the value of corporate
assets in the United States comes from intangibles.15 Intangibles now also
constitute on average 60 to 75 percent of corporate market value.16
The fact that intangibles are an increasingly important source of value for
companies today reflects a shift in dominant business production and operation
models to ones involving significant utilization of intangibles.17 Intangibles have
become important largely as a result of economic factors that have intensified
since the mid-1980s, particularly increased competition resulting from
globalization and deregulation and an upsurge ICTs.18
As a result of these changes, a significant number of businesses now operate
under a paradigm based on accumulation and utilization of intangibles,19 both
alone and in conjunction with tangible assets or products, whereas prior to this
shift, most businesses operated under a tangible asset paradigm.20 In addition to
several OECD countries), at
www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/bedrijfsleven/algemeen/OECDezRapp.pdf
14
Nakamura, supra note 13, at 1, 5.
15
Id.
16
See Letter from Baruch Lev to Representative S.J. “Billy” Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 2002), at
http://pages.stern.ny.edu/~blev/.
17
See infra notes 124 to 236 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 123 to 258 and accompanying text for discussion of this paradigm shift. See
also BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES 9 (2001) (discussing the factors underlying increased
competition); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter, “OECD”),
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Industrial Performance and Competitiveness in
an Era of Globlalisation and Technological Change 3 (Jun. 9, 1998), DSTI/IND(97)23/FINAL, at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/2390669.pdf.
19
As used herein, the term paradigm reflects and is based upon the model of scientific worldview
and practice based on paradigm shifts developed by Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed., 1970).
20
See Jan-Erik Gröjer & Ulf Johanson, Voluntary Guidelines on the Disclosure of Intangibles: A
Bridge Over Troubled Water? 2, at www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritum/download/Volunt.doc; J.
Bradford DeLong, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth, in
AGENDA FOR THE NATION 19, 20 (H. Aaron, et al.eds., 2003), at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/dgk_brook.pdf; Leonard Nakamura,
Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
BUSINESS REVIEW 3 (July/Aug. 1999); Claudia Goldin, Labor Markets in the Twentieth Century
50, National Bureau of Economic Research (April 28, 1998) (stating that human capital
accumulation and technological _________ in the twentieth century plays the role that physical
capital accumulation played in nineteenth century in serving as the engine of growth), at
http://econweb.fas.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/labor20th.pdf; Lionel Nesta & Pier Paolo Saviotti,
Intangible Assets and Market Value: Evidence from Biotechnology Firms 3 (2003), at
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increased use of intangibles in the production of goods and services, an expansion
has also occurred in the consumption of goods that are themselves nonphysical,
such as digital products, services and entertainment.21
The dominant nineteenth century model of industrial production, which persisted
well into the twentieth century, was founded on the use of economies of scale and
mass production based on exploitation of physical assets.22 Some argue that the
electronics revolution that began in the 1970s led to an increase in intangibles, at
least partly because the electronics revolution made intangibles investment more
remunerative.23
Consequently, included within and closely associated with the intangibles
paradigm is the increasingly dominant ICT sector.24 Although increased
investment in intangibles has emerged as a core feature of the ICT sector, the
intangibles phenomenon is broader, and intangibles have become associated with

http://www.mot.chalmers.se/dept/idy/workshop2003/nestasaviotti.pdf (noting that intangible
capital has overtaken physical capital since 1950s).
21
See Charles Goldfinger, Understanding and Measuring the Intangible Economy: Some
Suggestions for Further Research 4 (Aug. 1, 1997), CIRET Seminar, Helsinki, at
http://www.gefma.com/Francais/Present-fr/Intangibles%20research%20CIRET.doc (noting
consumption of nonphysical goods).
22
See Gröjer & Johanson, supra note 20, at 2; DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 37-38; Nakamura,
supra note 13, at 6-9 (noting that historically tangible assets were the resources that produced
wealth); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1990) (Review of PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989)) (“The United States has
witnessed a steady decline in heavy manufacturing, while the industries most affected by
intellectual property law—such as entertainment and computer software—have flourished.”).
23
See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 19; Nakamura, supra note 13, at 5; see also OECD, supra
note 18, at 3 (indicating that core mechanism of new model is increasing returns on knowledge
across broad spectrum); Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt & Shinkyu Yang, Intangible Assets:
How the Interaction of Computers and Organizational Structure Affects Stock Market Valuations
4, at http://grace.wharton.upenn.edu/~lhitt/itqo.pdf (finding in empirical study that each dollar
invested in computers is associated with an increase in firm market valuation of $5 to $20 as
compared with an increase of $1 for investments in other areas and that high information
technology user firms were more likely to adopt modified business organization and work
practices, which increased firm value of certain technology intensive companies beyond what
would be accounted for by tangible assets alone).
24
Goldfinger, supra note 21 (exploring hypothesis that complementary relationship between new
intangible organization assets and information technology capital parallels that of memos and
filing systems and the printing press and factory redesign and the adoption of electric motors); see
also DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 37-38; Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23, at 2. For further
discussion of how intangibles may be defined, see infra notes 34 to 45 and accompanying text.
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increased business value for both ICT and non-ICT intensive companies and for
uses both involving and not involving ICTs.25
As intangibles have become increasingly pervasive, the challenges such resources
pose for existing systems and practices have become all the more apparent.
Further, questions have arisen that are not yet resolved regarding how such
resources should be treated under existing regimes and systems of measurement
such as securities disclosure requirements, accounting rules, intellectual property
laws and national income accounting systems.26 Such regimes and systems were
not developed in contemplation of the current business environment in which
intangibles form a critical core.27 As a result, the advent of intangibles has
diminished the effectiveness of certain regulatory systems and checks.28
With the rise of intangibles has thus come a certain level of confusion as to how
existing categories, rules and regulations initially drawn up in the context of a
tangibles paradigm should apply under an intangibles paradigm. This confusion is
evident in the application of legal rules, including intellectual property and
securities laws, as well as in the accounting area.29 Although existing securities
disclosure and accounting practices may be applied in this new intangibles
oriented context, new regulatory systems to deal with the implications of
intangibles and ICTs have not been developed.30
25

See James Guthrie, Ulf Johanson, P.N. Bukh & P. Sánchez, Intangibles and the Transparent
Enterprise: New Strands of Knowledge, 4 J. INTELL. CAPITAL 429, 429 (2003).
26
See generally Lev, supra note 18 (giving general overview of the role of intangibles largely
from an accounting and policy perspective); see also Bart van Ark, Understanding Productivity
and Income Gaps in the OECD Area: Are ICT and Intangibles the Missing Link, Groningen
Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board (March 2002) (discussing the extent
to which ICT and intangibles may explain gaps in labor and productivity national income
statistics).
27
See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets (Oct. 1999), Speech
at Economic Club (noting that as intangibles become more important questions have arisen about
whether existing disclosures standards reflect the true value of intangibles as drivers of value), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm.
28
See infra notes 299 to 331 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 266 to 331 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue with respect to
accounting; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition: Intangibles,
Intellectual Property and Innovation (2006) (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the
implications of the increasing predominance of intangibles for intellectual property frameworks)
[hereinafter, “Arewa, Strategic Behaviors”]; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of
Private Offerings in the Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37
U. TOL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing some implications of the cyberspace era for
private securities offerings).
30
See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 813, 830
(2003) (noting that current accounting treatment of intangibles is an historical relic from a tangible
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Changes have been made in legal and accounting rules as a result of Enron and
other instances of corporate fraud. These changes include adoption of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,31 as well as modification of accounting
requirements with respect the special purpose entities (SPEs) that played such a
prominent role in Enron’s activities.32 Despite these modifications, the lack of
attention to issues relating to accounting treatment generally and the changing
nature and role of intangibles in business practice more specifically, makes such
reforms unlikely to clear the intangibles haze.33
B.

Defining and Classifying Intangibles

Intangibles, which include, among other things, information technology, research
and development, brand equity, intellectual property rights, corporate culture,
stockholder relations, access to markets, knowledgeable workers and management
and human resources, are also referred to as knowledge assets and intellectual
capital.34 Intangibles may include discovery/innovation aspects, such as new
products and patents, human resources factors such as compensation and work
practice and organizational capital aspects, which would include Cisco’s webbased virtual organization, Wal-Mart’s integrated inventory and supply operations
and Dell’s built-to-order computer distribution channels.35
Although the term asset is often used to refer to intangibles, many intangibles are
not accounting assets in the traditional sense.36 A clear lack of consensus exists
asset paradigm in which concern may have existed about booking nonexistent assets and that
keeping such treatment “in place for decades, while the importance of wealth created by R&D has
increased, is inexcusable”).
31
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7201
et seq.) (2002) (hereinafter, “Sarbanes-Oxley”).
32
See infra notes 93 to 94 and accompanying text.
33
Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus
Rents, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1027 (2003) (noting that an uncertain regulatory
outcome is likely for Sarbanes-Oxley, which was intended to address the scandals and restore
confidence in securities markets, but which was a response that essentially regulates the
accounting profession, while containing “very little direct regulation of accounting treatments and
audit practice”).
34
Kenneth L. Kraemer & Jason Dedrick, Strategic Use of the Internet and E-Commerce: Cisco
Systems, 11 J. STRAT. INFO. SYS. 5, 5 (2002); Michael G. Harvey & Robert F. Lusch, Balancing
the Intellectual Capital Books: Intangible Liabilities, 17 EUR. MGMT J. 85, 85 (1999).
35
See David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Research and Development Productivity in the Chemical
Industry 6-7 (Mar. 2001) (noting that Cisco’s web-based product installation system was estimated
by Cisco’s Chief Financial Officer to save $1.5 billion over 3 years), at
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/chemical-industry.doc.
36
An accounting asset can be treated as a capital expense and recorded on a company’s balance
sheet. See Gregory H. Bentson, Accounting Numbers and Economic Values, 27 ANTITRUST
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as to how intangible assets should be defined, 37 and how intangibles are classified
may depend on the person making the definition.38 The most basic definition of
intangible assets is a negative definition in which intangibles are considered to be
nonphysical, nonfinancial assets.39 However, a wide range of definitions exists.40
Most would probably agree that intangible assets are capital assets that lack
physical substance, but which are likely to yield future benefits.41 A three-fold
classification of intangibles frequently proposed is one that distinguishes
structural, human and market intangibles.42 Intangibles may also be embedded
BULLETIN 161, 166 (1982) (noting that assets and liabilities are recorded following an arms-length
transactions where a change in legal title to goods or the establishment of a legal obligation to pay
in the future occurs).
37
Ulf Johanson, Mobilizing Change: Characteristics of Intangibles Proposed by 11 Swedish
Firms 17 (June 9-10, 1999), International Symposium, Measuring and Reporting Intellectual
Capital, Experience, Issues, and Prospects, Amsterdam (noting that intangibles are poorly defined
and any consensus in classifications is the exception rather than the rule).
38
Id.; see also Croes, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that accountant, managers, policy makers and
statisticians would define intangible assets differently).
39
Croes, supra note 13, at 4; Lev, supra note 18, at 8-10 (noting that such nonfinancial,
nonphysical factors are expected to generate future productive benefits to the individuals or firms
that control their use and contribute to or are used in the production of goods or provision of
services).
40
Magali Demotes-Mainard, Statistical Information on Intangibles 2 (Oct. 6-10, 2003), Voorburg
Group on Service Statistics 18th Meeting, Tokyo, at
www.stat.go.jp/english/info/meetings/voorburg/pdf/mag_stat.pdf (noting that this negative
definition may be a hollow definition); see also GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR,
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 15-54 (3d ed. 2000) for a
comprehensive overview of various types of intangibles.
41
Leandro Cañibano, Manuel García-Ayuso Covarsí & M. Paloma Sánchez, The Value Relevance
and Managerial Implications of Intangibles: A Literature Review 10-14 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript) (acknowledging multiple definitions of intangibles and seeing point of agreement as a
view of intangibles as sources of probable future economic profits, lacking physical substance and
controlled by a firm as a result of previous events or transactions), at
www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritum/download/value.pdf. International Accounting Standard 38,
issued by the International Accounting Standard Committee, defines an intangible asset as an
“identifiable nonmonetary asset without physical substance held for use in the production or
supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes.” See International
Accounting Standard Committee, International Accounting Standard 38, at ¶7 (July 1998)
(hereinafter, “IAS 38”); see also Hervé Stolowy, Axel Haller & Volker Klockhaus, Accounting for
Brands in France and Germany Compared with IAS 38 (Intangible Assets: An Illustration of the
Difficulty of International Harmonisation), 36 INT’L J. ACCOUNTING 147 (2001).
42
Gröjer & Johanson, supra note 20, at 12; Jason Hurwitz, Stephen Lines, Bill Montgomery &
Jeffrey Schmidt, The Linkage between Management Practices, Intangibles Performance and Stock
Returns, 3 J. INTELL. CAP. 51 (2002) (discussing four areas of intangibles assets: human capital,
organizational capital, customer capital and intellectual property); Jan-Erik Gröjer, Intangibles and
Accounting Classification: In Search of a Classification Strategy, 26 ACCOUNTING ORG. & SOC’Y
695 (2001) (suggesting ways in which intangibles could be classified).
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within and interact extensively with physical assets.43 As a result, a clear-cut
delineation between tangible and intangible assets is not always possible,
particularly in the ICT arena.
Part of the reason intangibles are so difficult to define is a consequence of the
polymorphic and ubiquitous nature of the information or knowledge upon which
they are often based.44 This is also a reason why so much confusion exists with
respect to intangibles in the accounting and legal spheres. Establishing
boundaries, practices and procedures with respect to resources and assets for
which definitions vary, potentially significantly, presents certain challenges.45
These definitional issues have serious implications not only for accounting
treatment and consequently securities disclosure, but also for the uses of
intangibles by companies under the intangibles paradigm.
C.

Securities Disclosure Requirements and Accounting Rules

A major factor in the uncertainty and resulting higher risk for intangibles is the
fact that the true economic value and nature of intangibles are not adequately
addressed by financial statements prepared in accordance with United States
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). GAAP is the principal
source of guidance and authority for the preparation of company financial
statements in the U.S.46 The development of accounting and auditing standards in
the U.S. has historically included both the SEC and private standards setting
organizations. The SEC has largely, although not entirely, ceded responsibility
for setting accounting standards to private organizations such as the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”),47 whose standards are treated as
generally accepted under current securities disclosure requirements.48

43

See Lev, supra note 18, at 7.
Charles Goldfinger, Intangible Economy and its Implications for Statistics and Statisticians, 65
INT’L STAT. REV. 191, 198 (1997) (“More generally, economists have difficulties coming to grips
with the polymorphic and ubiquitous nature of information, simultaneously a good, a production
asset and a market attribute.”).
45
For a discussion of the implications of this boundary-marking process from a legal perspective,
see Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29.
46
Gary Shorter, Auditing and Accounting Regulation: Key SEC Powers 2 (July 8, 2002),
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RS21257 (noting that financial statement
preparation rules such as GAAP are intended to help ensure that financial data are presented fairly
and are comparable between firms and industries), at
http://www.shelby.senate.gov/legislation/leg_pdf/account3.pdf.
47
See infra notes 55 to 61 and accompanying text.
48
See infra note 55.
44
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The SEC has considerable statutory authority to establish accounting and auditing
standards. Both the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) set minimum standards
for accountants that prepare company financial statements.49 The Exchange Act50
and the Investment Company Act of 194051 give the SEC authority to set
accounting standards to be used to prepare required financial statements as well as
auditing standards.52 In addition, the SEC has promulgated Regulation S-X, an
extensive body of regulation that governs registrant preparation of financial
statements.53
Despite this statutory and regulatory authority and framework, the SEC has
largely delegated GAAP rule making authority to FASB,54 which is the primary
authority that makes accounting determinations in the United States.55 As the
primary accounting rule making authority, FASB is at times subject to heavy
industry lobbying and pressure with regard to its policies and pronouncements,
49

Section 17(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Items 25 and 25 of Schedule A of the
Securities Act of 1933 require that the financial statements of registered companies be audited by
independent public or certified accountants. See 15 U.S.C. §77aa(25) and (26) (2003); 15 U.S.C.
§78q (2003).
50
15 U.S.C. §77s (2003).
51
See 15 U.S.C. §78q (2003); 15 U.S.C. §80a-30 (2003).
52
See George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and after
Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1325 (2003) (discussing SEC authority to set accounting and auditing
standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l and 78m (2003); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9 and 80a-29 (2003) (giving the
SEC the authority to set auditing standards).
53
17 C.F.R. §210.3-01 et seq. (2005).
54
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1037 fn. 49 (“The SEC already has the power to impose accounting
rules. The SEC exercises its power only rarely, preferring to leave the job to FASB, which acts
under the threat of intervention should the SEC’s preferences not be satisfied.”) (citing DAVID R.
HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 146 (3d ed.
2001)); Financial RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES 58-59, General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Oct. 2002) (discussing the relationship between
the SEC and FASB) (GAO-03-138), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Hawkins, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that the SEC made known very
early in its existence its expectation that the private sector would assume the main role in
establishing accounting rules).
55
See Tracy N. Tucker, It Really Is Just Trying to Help: The History of FASB and Its Role in
Modern Accounting Practices, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1023, 1018 (2003); (noting that
although its authority derives from federal securities law, FASB is a private rule making body);
see also SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (identifying FASB standards as generally
accepted for the purposes of federal securities laws); SEC, Policy Statement: Reaffirming the
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 338221 (reaffirming post-Sarbanes-Oxley that FASB standards are considered generally accepted for
the purposes of federal securities laws), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm.
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which in the past has influenced its decisions in connection with accounting
standards.56 Although the SEC typically defers to FASB, it does at times issue its
own accounting standards and may impose particular standards for accounting
statements in SEC filings.57 On the audit side, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (“AICPA”) has historically largely controlled generally
accepted auditing standards (“GAAS”),58 which are related to GAAP.59 The
AICPA was displaced by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”) established under Sarbanes-Oxley.60
GAAP is an important standard with respect to company financial statements, and
a statement of compliance with GAAP is a standard part of audited financial
statements for public and private companies.61 Such audited financial statements
56

See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1033 (noting that the accounting profession “used its influence to
stifle FASB’s reform initiatives concerning accounting for stock options”); Stephen A. Zeff,
Evolution of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 27-29, Outline of a presentation at an
International Symposium on Accounting Standards sponsored by the Ministry of Finance of the
People's Republic of China, Beijing, July 12, 2004, at
www.iasplus.com/resource/0407zeffusgaap.pdf (discussing FASB failure, in face of considerable
opposition from the high technology industry in particular, to issue SFAS 123, which concerned
expensing of employee stock options, after Congress indicated its intent to put FASB out of
business if the standard was issued).
57
Jerry Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities
Laws, 28 N.C. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 767 (2003) (noting that SEC imposes accounting
standards through rules and SEC releases); see also SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 (Dec. 3,
1999), 17 C.F.R. § 211, at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm.
58
Audits are comprehensive reviews and certifications of a company’s financial statements
conducted by Certified Public Accountants (“CPAs”), who are qualified to conduct audits and
certify a company’s books and records. See Markham, supra note 57, at 765-766 (noting that
audits are conducted by qualified CPAs).
59
Shorter, supra note 46, at 2-3 (noting that GAAS and GAAP have a complementary
relationship; audits, which are governed by GAAS, are the expression of an opinion on a
company’s financial statements, which are normally prepared in compliance with GAAP).
60
See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31; see also Benston, supra note 52, at 1325; Perry E. Wallace,
Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron, et al.: Governing Outside the Box
Without Stepping Off the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 117-120 (2003)
(discussing the PCAOB and FASB).
61
An auditor’s opinion is a critical part of audited financial statements, and companies do their
utmost to ensure that they receive a clean opinion (i.e., without qualification) from their auditors.
See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that management of a company is responsible for the
content of financial statements and that statements issued by independent certified public accounts
reflect the accountant’s personal opinion as to their fairness, degree of conformity with GAAP and
consistency with accounting practices in previous accounting periods). Enron’s 2000 Annual
Report includes such an opinion from Arthur Andersen, which reflects the critical language in an
auditor’s opinion regarding a company’s financials comply with GAAP. An audit opinion that
reflects the language below is considered a “clean” audit opinion. Arthur Andersen’s Enron audit
opinion included the following language: “In our opinion, the financial statements referred to
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form an important and prominent aspect of companies’ required securities
disclosure. Company securities disclosures may also include unaudited financial
statements that are not strictly in compliance with GAAP in quarterly 10-Q
Reports, for example.62 The exclusion under GAAP from company balance
sheets of an increasingly large portion of the value of firms, including value
derived from knowledge, technology, clients, and other factors, is at the core of
concerns about accounting measurements and consequently securities disclosure
standards under the intangibles paradigm.63
The lack of comprehensive disclosure requirements for intangibles has given
companies greater latitude to represent economic reality with regard to
intangibles. Consequently, in addition to being a dominant factor in the market to
book gap,64 the intangibles paradigm has significantly affected business structure
and business practice in a multitude of ways.65 Of particular interest is how the
intangibles paradigm has influenced company representations of economic reality
in presentations of themselves vis-à-vis public markets and the implications of
such framing.66
D.

Financial Statement Presentations
1. Core Aspects of Financial Statement Presentations

Financial statements are core elements of companies’ representations of the
economic reality of their business and form an important element of companies’
securities disclosure. In addition, investors and others rely on financial statement
above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Enron Corp. and subsidiaries
as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the results of their operations, cash flows and changes in
shareholders’ equity for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2000, in
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States.” ENRON 2000
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2001) (hereinafter, “ENRON 2000 ANNUAL REPORT”).
62
See Huron Consulting Group, A Study of Restatement Matters (Chicago, Huron Consulting
2002) (noting that an auditor’s association with quarterly financial statements is limited to review
procedures of less significant scope than the procedures for an audit), available at
http://huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/Huron_RestatementStudy2002.pdf.
63
Steven M.H. Wallman, Intangible Assets, Valuation and Accounting Standards (May 1, 2002),
Remarks at International Intellectual Property Institute, Washington, D.C. (“GAAP …[is]
floundering with regard to the question of what to do with intangibles, and it is something which I
think is starting to become a crisis as opposed to simply an interesting problem to resolve.”), at
www.iipi.org/activities/forums/Assets_Presentation_Transcript.pdf.
64
See infra notes 164 to 187 and accompanying text.
65
See generally JUERGEN H. DAUM, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION (2003);
Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23.
66
See infra notes 188 to 208 and accompanying text.
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presentations in evaluating companies for investment and other decisions. The
basic financial statements of companies are generally standardized, with the
balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement being important aspects
of most financial statement presentations. These standard accounting statements
are incorporated into securities disclosure requirements by virtue of Regulation SX, which requires that registrants file certain specified financial statements,
including balance sheets,67 income statements,68 cash flow statements69 and
statements of changes in stockholders’ equity.70
In general, balance sheets are statements as of a specified point in time that
describe the assets and liabilities of a company.71 Balance sheets are indicative of
a company’s liquidity, solvency and financial flexibility.72 In contrast, income
statements cover a specified period of time and describe the sources of revenues
and expense for a company during that time period.73 Income statements
generally give an indication of the profitability, investment value and
creditworthiness of a company’s business operations.74 A cash flow statement,
which can be derived from the numbers in the balance sheet and income
statement, reconciles financial statements, which are often based on accrual
principles, to actual flows of cash in a business operation during a specified
period of time.75
In contrast to cash accounting, which records revenues and expenses as cash is
received or spent, accrual principles would recognize such revenues or expenses
and record them in financial statements based on certain accounting rules that
govern accruals.76 These rules often have nothing to do with the time of receipt or
payment of cash.77 In addition to the actual numbers in the financial statements,
financial statements are usually accompanied by extensive notes that give further
detail concerning application of relevant accounting principles and other factors
67

17 C.F.R. §210.3-01 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant balance sheets).
17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 and 210.3-03 (2005) (outlining requirements and instructions for registrant
income statements).
69
17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant cash flow statements).
70
17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant statement of changes in
stockholders’ equity).
71
DONALD E. KIESO, JERRY J. WEYGANDT & TERRY D. WARFIELD, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
170 (2004).
72
Id. at 170-171.
73
Id. at 124.
74
Id. at 124.
75
Id. at 190.
76
Id. at 93.
77
Id.
68
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underlying the numbers that appear in the financial statements.78 The balance
sheet, income statement and cash flow statement are core aspects of most
financial statements. These financial statements, together with their notes, are
intended to give a fairly complete picture of a company’s business operations.79
Despite the use of the same core financial statements to measure and depict
company performance, financial statement presentations are by no means uniform
and will often vary, for example, depending on the nature and substance of a
company’s business. As a result, a venture capital fund’s financial statements will
typically look different than an operating company’s financial statements in terms
of the sorts of assets and liabilities that are evident in each and the nature of
sources of revenues and expenses.80 Similarly, the financial statements of a
manufacturing company will generally look in terms of types of assets and
liabilities and sources of revenue and expenses unlike those of a company that
primarily produces software.81
2. Framing and Financial Statement Presentations under the
Intangibles Paradigm
In addition to variations in financial statements that reflect fundamental
differences in companies’ businesses and operations, companies may choose to
represent a given economic or business reality in disparate ways. The intangibles
paradigm has intensified pressure on existing fault lines in accounting regimes
that govern business. Accounting rules relating to revenue recognition and the
capitalization or expensing of expenditures, among others, are areas in which
accounting treatment is particularly significant and frequently material to a
company’s business operations and stock market valuation.82 As such, companies
have considerable interest in framing their businesses and operations using
accounting measures that depict them in the best possible light. This framing is
apparent, for example, in how companies manage earnings in order to meet and
78

Id. at 42.
See infra notes 83 to 87 and accompanying text.
80
A venture capital balance sheet, for example, would typically primarily include assets such as
cash and portfolio company investments. A typical operating company would likely have far
more assets connected to business operations, such as plant, property and equipment, for example.
81
A manufacturing company is far more likely to have significant amounts of fixed assets such as
real estate and plant, property and equipment.
82
This is reflected, for example, in the fact that revenue recognition has been the principal reason
for financial restatements in recent years. See Huron Consulting Group, supra note 62, at 10
(noting that revenue recognition was the leading cause of financial restatements between 1997 and
2002, causing 20.7% of such restatements, while capitalization and expensing of assets was the
fifth leading cause, contributing to 7.9% of such restatements).
79
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beat analysts’ expectations of earnings and is particularly evident in the
accounting practices companies use to accomplish this objective.83
Securities disclosure requirements incorporate accounting rules and practices that
often give companies some degree of flexibility in how they may characterize
their business and operations. The accounting choices a company makes often
reflect management conceptions about the company’s business model. Such
framing occurs in the context of existing accounting rules and standards that are
used to determine appropriate accounting treatment for a particular transaction.
The goal of these accounting rules and standards is to present a fair picture of a
company’s financial condition and operations,84 which may at times be at tension
with the company’s desire to frame its business operations or a particular
transaction in a certain manner.
Choices companies make about accounting treatment are influenced by
accounting rules as well as companies’ framing of their business and operations
and consequently representations of economic reality. The decision as to whether
to capitalize an expenditure, and place the purchased item on the company’s
balance sheet, for example, may differ depending on the nature of the expenditure
and whether the expenditure relates to intangible or tangible goods or services.
Under current accounting rules, physical property such as buildings are generally
treated differently than expenditures for intangibles such as the development of a
web-based virtual organization to handle internal and external business
operations.85 This differential treatment results in buildings appearing on balance
sheets as capital expenses, while the majority of the value associated with
building the virtual organization would most likely be treated as an operating
expense on the company’s income statement during the time periods in which
such expenditures occur.86

83

See Ann Reilly Dowd, How Cooked Books Threaten Directors, CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER
(Winter 1998), at 1, at http://www.boardmember.com/issues/archive.pl?article_id=10577&V=1.
84
Christine E. Earley, Kate Odabashian & Michael Wilenborg, Some Thoughts on the Audit
Failure at Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1013, 1015-1016 (2003) (discussing requirement under GAAP that financial
statements fairly present the financial condition of a company and its operations); GAO Report,
supra note 54, at 43 (noting that the “SEC views the integrity of financial reporting as a
“fundamental building block” of the full and fair disclosure that gives investors confidence in U.S.
markets.”).
85
See infra notes 266 to 299 and accompanying text.
86
See infra notes 272 to 290 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cisco’s virtual
organization.
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The consequences of this differential treatment can be illustrated by a simplified
example.87 For the purposes of this example, assume a company has an income
statement reflecting $100 in revenues and $50 in expenses in a given time period,
giving the company $50 in profit during that period, and a balance sheet with
$100 in assets and $100 in liabilities as of that point in time. If this company
were to spend $50 to purchase a building, which is a tangible asset, the accounting
treatment for the purchase of the building would likely be different from $50
spent to develop an intangible web-based virtual organization. In the case of the
$50 spent to finance the building, assuming that the company takes out a
mortgage loan for the entire $50 expenditure, the company’s balance sheet would
change. The $50 building would now be added as an asset on the balance sheet,
offset on the liability side by a debt of $50, reflecting the mortgage the company
has taken out to finance its purchase. The result would be that the company
would now have $150 in assets and $150 in liabilities. In contrast, the company’s
expenditure of $50 for the web-based virtual organization would not change the
company’s balance sheet, because the web-based virtual organization, as an
intangible, would typically be considered an operating expense, not a capital
expense. As a result, the $50 spent for the virtual organization would be recorded
as an expense on the company’s income statement. This would mean that the
company would now have $50 in additional expenses or $100 in revenues and
$100 in expenses, which would mean that the company’s profitability has been
reduced because where it previously had $50 in profit, it now has $0 profit since
revenues and expenses are now equal. This simple example illustrates in a small
sense the potential variations that may emerge in company financial statements
just as a result of the relative intensity and scope of intangibles in company
business operations. In aggregate, such differences are potentially quite
significant and in some instances problematic.88
However, accounting rules also offer companies choices about the accounting
treatment they use to represent the economic reality of a particular transaction. In
the case of a building, a company could buy a building and record it as an asset on
the company’s balance sheet, offset on the liability side by a debt that might
reflect a mortgage that the company might have taken out in connection with the
purchase of the building, for example. Alternatively, the company could
transform the characterization of this building for financial statement purposes by
87

This example is simplified in many ways, including in assuming, for example, that no other
expenses are associated with the building purchase or mortgage, that no tangible assets are
recorded on the balance sheet as part of the development or the virtual organization and that the
building does not depreciate.
88
See infra notes 265 to 298 and accompanying text.
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constructing a synthetic lease.89 This ability to transform representations of
economic reality in financial statements has significant implications under the
intangibles paradigm by virtue of the nature and treatment of intangibles under
current accounting rules.
E.

Synthetic Leases and Financial Statement Transformations
1. The Structure and Magnitude of Synthetic Lease Transactions

A synthetic lease transaction would typically involve a company establishing up a
third party SPE that would be characterizable as independent from the company
for financial statement purposes. Such independence would mean that SPE
financial statements would not need to be consolidated or combined with the
financial statements of the company setting up the synthetic lease transaction (the
“sponsor company”). By removing this transaction from the company’s balance
sheet and making it appear “off balance sheet,” the company may be able to keep
any debt associated with the building purchase from influencing its financial
ratios.90 SPEs are typically created for the particular transaction or series of
transactions.91 Prior to the Enron controversy, accounting rules for independence
for an SPE were generally interpreted by FASB and the SEC to require that 3
percent of the capitalization of the SPE be comprised of equity contribution from
an owner not connected to the sponsoring company setting up the SPE.92 In
addition, the owner of such equity actually needed to be at risk with respect to its
equity contribution to the SPE.93 Following the Enron controversy, FASB issued
89

See Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Finance, Financial Accounting and Tax
Ownership, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 445, 446 (2000) (“In a synthetic lease transaction, money is
borrowed based on the financial strength of a tenant of property and on that tenant's agreement to
pay rent. The lender expects the debt to be serviced from the rental obligation of the tenant rather
than from the financial resources of the nominal owner and borrower. The lease is ‘synthetic’
insofar as it is designed to achieve a blended treatment: the tenant reports it as an operating lease
for financial accounting purposes but as a mortgage for federal income tax purposes.”)
90
See infra notes 103 to 107 and accompanying text.
91
See Weidner, supra note 89, at 448 (noting that SPEs are created solely for the purpose of
entering into a financing transaction or transactions); Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski,
Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: FASB Interpretation 46(R), CPA J. ONLINE
(July 2004) (noting that SPEs are created by a party to carry out a “specific purpose, activity, or
series of transactions” and “have no purpose other than the transactions for which they are
created.”), at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/704/essentials/p30.htm.
92
Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91.
93
Id.; see also FASB, EITF Issue 90-15 (setting 3 percent as the minimum third-party interest in
an SPE to avoid consolidation of the SPE with sponsor company financial statements); Bala G.
Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND BEYOND:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES
103, 114-116 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., 2002) (discussing changing
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new criterion increasing the 3 percent standard to 10 percent, although the revised
rule does not establish a bright-line test.94
SPEs are widely used by businesses in the U.S., particularly in securitization
transactions. A random review of 66 public companies in 2001 found that
disclosed SPE transactions accounted for close to $230 billion in value, with 92%
involving securitizations of receivables and the remaining 8% involving leases.95
These figures may reflect only a portion of actual transactions involving SPEs
since under current financial statement reporting requirements, SPEs established
by a sponsor company may remain undisclosed and thus essentially hidden from
readers of sponsor company financial statements.96 The total size of just the
synthetic lease market for real estate, equipment and other assets may be as large
as $600 billion.97 The dangers of undisclosed SPEs are illustrated by Enron,
which developed thousands of such SPEs as a way to remove and conceal losses
as well as debts and other liabilities.98 In most cases, however, Enron’s financials
did not comply with applicable accounting rules.99 The accuracy of
representations of economic reality in accounting presentations involving SPEs is
largely dependent on the adequacy and transparency of securities disclosure, the
nature of the underlying accounting treatment and extent to which such
accounting treatment is actually disclosed.
In a typical synthetic lease transaction, an SPE would acquire or construct the
building and would be the borrower on paper of any mortgage associated with the
building.100 The SPE would then enter into a short-term lease (usually less than
consolidation rules for SPEs and noting that the 3 percent rule was an ad-hoc solution intended as
a short term band-aid that subsequently became standard practice).
94
See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91; see also FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) (Dec. 2003).
95
See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91.
96
Id.
97
Dharan, supra note 93, at 107 (noting that estimates of the size of the synthetic lease market
vary, and that as much as $600 billion in real estate, equipment and other assets may be accounted
for using synthetic leases in the U.S.).
98
See generally, BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); WILLIAM POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S.
TROUBH & HERBERT S. WINOKUR, JR., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002)
(hereinafter, “POWERS REPORT”).
99
See generally POWERS REPORT, supra note 98; Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting that
Enron’s failure is “a case of SPEs run amok”); Bratton, supra note 33, at 1042 (“Enron’s
financials would have been out of compliance with GAAP even with its SPEs in compliance with
the rules on consolidation at all times.”).
100
Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax
Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 54-58; Weidner, supra note 89,
at 447 (“In terms of the desired outcome, a synthetic lease is a transaction in the form of a lease
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ten years) with the typically high credit rating sponsor company.101 The
transaction documents between the SPE and the mortgage lender would give the
mortgage lender “assurance that its debt is secure and provide the corporate user
[sponsor company] with essentially all of the material benefits and burdens of
ownership of the real estate including, importantly, the right to capture the benefit
of appreciation in the value of the property.”102
This would mean that the company would report less debt on its balance sheet
than it would without the synthetic lease, all other things equal.103 The synthetic
lease transaction would enable the company to treat its payment obligations under
the synthetic lease transaction as a lease obligation that it can footnote as a long
term rental obligation (operating lease) as opposed to a debt obligation that would
be reported as a balance sheet liability (capital lease).104 Synthetic leases thus
allow a particular representation of a certain economic reality for financial
statement reporting purposes that may permit the sponsoring company to
transform its depiction of such underlying economic reality.105 The SPE involved
that embodies a blend of characteristics that enables it to be characterized as a lease for financial
accounting purposes, while also permitting it to be treated as the nominal tenant's mortgage or
‘financing transaction’ for federal income tax purposes.”).
101
Luppino, supra note 100, at 447.
102
Id. at 55.
103
Id. at 50 (noting that management avoids balance sheet debt because “various ratios used by
analysts to value companies are negatively affected by high debt”); Weidner, supra note 89, at
450-51 (“Synthetic leases keep certain assets and liabilities off balance sheet and also improve the
ratios by which businesses are judged. In general, a business looks less leveraged when it can take
a long-term liability off its books. In addition, the business may improve certain calculations and
financial ratios that are often closely monitored. For example, because no asset is booked if a lease
is classified as an operating lease, the lessee need not take a charge against earnings for
depreciation. This favorably impacts the share price-to-earnings ratio and the earnings-to-assets
ratio. In short, by keeping a heavily encumbered asset off the books, a user may preserve a more
favorable return-on-assets ratio, a more favorable return-on-equity ratio, and a more favorable
debt-to-equity ratio.”).
104
Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-69. Compliance with several FASB requirements would need to
be met for the company to treat the synthetic lease transaction as a lease obligation (operating
lease) as opposed to a debt obligation (capital lease). See FASB, Statement of Accounting
Standards No. 13, Accounting for Leases (Nov. 1976) (hereinafter, “FASB 13”) (discussing
treatment of capital and operating leases); FASB, Statement of Accounting Standards No. 98,
Accounting for Leases: Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate, Sales-Type Leases of
Real Estate, Definition of the Lease Term, Initial Direct Costs of Direct Financing Leases (May
1988) (amending FASB 13 and other FASB statements) (hereinafter, “FASB 98”); see also
Weidner, supra note 89, at 454-55 (noting that lessees [sponsor companies] seek to avoid
application of FASB 98 in constructing synthetic lease transactions since FASB 98 has a stricter
requirement with respect to debt obligations appearing on the lessee’s balance sheet).
105
Weidner, supra note 89, at 487 (“Unlike the federal income tax law, the financial accounting
standards have been less stable and definitely need fixing. Most simply, FASB currently permits
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in a synthetic lease would not, however, necessarily be independent from the
company in any real economic terms. As a result, in contrast to financial
statement presentation, tax treatment of the synthetic lease would reflect the
actual underlying economic reality of the transaction,106 and the sponsor company
would be considered the owner with regard to the tax treatment of any debt
liability associated with the synthetic lease transaction.107 The differential
treatment of synthetic leases for book and tax purposes reflects the potentially
varying ways in which companies can depict a given economic reality in different
contexts of presentation. Such differential presentations are by no means limited
to synthetic leases and other financial statement transformations.108
2. Synthetic Leases, SPEs and Transforming Representations of
Economic Reality
Although SPEs such as those associated with synthetic leases may have a genuine
underlying business purpose, they can also be entered into with the specific
accounting goal of removing debt or other liabilities from a balance sheet or
managing income statement earnings by being able to report gains or losses when
desired.109 Synthetic leases and other off-balance sheet financing transactions
enormous amounts of debt to vanish from a company's balance sheet. Corporations are permitted
to appear far less leveraged than they are by recasting mortgages as leases. In a system that prides
itself on transparency, this transactional sleight-of-hand should not be permitted.”)
106
The differential tax treatment of synthetic lease transactions and fact that the company would
generally be considered an owner for tax purposes is indicative of the underlying economic reality
of the transaction. The existence and role played by the SPE does not change this fundamental
economic reality. Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-59 (discussing tax treatment of synthetic leases);
Weidner, supra note 89, at 486-87 (comparing financial accounting and tax treatment of synthetic
leases).
107
Luppino, supra note 100, at 51, 59 (noting that the tenant (sponsor company) in a typical
synthetic lease transaction is the owner of the property for tax purposes, enabling the sponsor
company to use such debt to its benefit for tax purposes, which permits the company to “support
loss deductions, allow for nontaxable receipts of cash, and, in general, drive tax deferral.”);
Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 91 (noting that synthetic leases serve two important purposes,
enabling a company to treat a lease as an operating expense, recording payments as rent expense
while keeping the underlying assets and liabilities off its balance sheet and allowing a company to
treat the transaction as if it owned the leased property for tax purposes); Dharan, supra note 93, at
108 (noting that the sponsor company does not have to report the building in a synthetic lease
transaction as a capital lease because control of the building is held by an SPE whose legal
structure prohibits the sponsor company from “controlling” it).
108
See infra notes 189 to 210 and accompanying text.
109
See Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future
Enrons?, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 113, 117-118 (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2003) (noting that SPEs may serve a number of purposes,
including hiding debt or poor performing assets, earnings management or quick execution of
related party transactions at desired prices).
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facilitated by SPEs highlight important aspects of financial statement rules. The
first is that, in addition to having a goal of presenting a fair and accurate picture of
a company’s finances and operations, accounting rules may be used legitimately
in such a way as to obscure underlying economic reality. In addition, accounting
rules have the potential to transform the depiction of this underlying reality by, for
example, turning an owner of a building into a tenant for financial statement
reporting purposes. The extent to which financial engineering or any
transformative or obscuring representations are apparent to readers of financial
statements is dependent on how a company chooses to frame its business and
financial statement presentations, the structure of the transformative transaction
and the adequacy of the company’s disclosure.110
Accounting treatment of intangibles more generally illustrates another area where
securities disclosure requirements and the accounting rules that they incorporate
may not fully reflect or accurately represent underlying economic reality.
Intangibles are typically not capitalized and placed on a company’s balance sheet
and are now a predominant source of value for many companies. As a result, the
information that a reader of a financial statement may receive from reading a
balance sheet, for example, is potentially quite different for companies operating
under an intangibles as opposed to tangibles paradigm business model. Under the
intangibles paradigm, present accounting treatment leads to many of the most
valuable assets of a company not even appearing on a balance sheet to the extent
that such value is associated with intangibles. This is the reason why financial
statements, particularly balance sheets, have under the intangibles paradigm
become less informative and less reflective of economic and business
fundamentals.111
F.

Intangibles and Financial Statements

Part of the uncertainty in the application of accounting rules to intangibles and
ICT era business practices is rooted in the nature of intangibles themselves. Also
relevant is the fact that existing accounting systems now applied to intangibles
were developed largely in the context of a business milieu built around a physical
asset industrial production paradigm.112 Existing accounting systems have been
110

See Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting the “power of SPEs as financial engineering tools”).
See infra notes 317 to 331 and accompanying text.
112
See H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT S. KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 6-18 (1987) (giving an overview of the historical context of the
development of accounting systems); see also Peter Walton, International Accounting and
History, in EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A HISTORY 1, 3 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (noting
that the financial reporting world is intimately linked with business environment).
111
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characterized as obsolete in light of the changing business context of their use.113
Current accounting and securities disclosure frameworks are based on
assumptions rooted in the past about tangibles paradigm business operations that
are no longer valid for a significant number of companies.114 For example, the
concept of “cost” inherent in existing accounting systems only makes sense in
light of costs being viewed under the assumptions of tangibles paradigm
manufacturing business practices and operations as attaching to a product as it
flows through a factory.115 This mismatch between tangibles paradigm
accounting rules and disclosure standards and increasingly prevalent intangibles
paradigm business operations is a factor in the increasing failure of accounting
systems to provide accurate information that is reflective of the true economic
value of a business.116 The divergence between regulatory structures and business
practice is intensified by the typically incremental nature of change in accounting
regulation as compared to the relatively rapid nature of changing business
practices associated with the intangibles paradigm.117
At the same time, with the intangibles paradigm, a significant amount of value is
now attributed to intangibles by public markets, which has contributed to strategic
behavior by businesses with respect to intangibles.118 The ethos underlying such
behaviors is recreated and reinforced through framing and business discourse at
two levels: externally in the strategic intellectual property management literature
and internally by virtue of business documents such as annual reports that position
companies within the midst of this intangibles paradigm in a way intended to
maximize company market valuations.119 The strategic intellectual property
management literature is supplemented and reinforced by such internally
generated company business documents, which include annual reports, SEC
filings, company websites and articles in the financial and mainstream press.
This association between intangibles and business and market value has
113

See Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 183-207.
See Walton, supra note 112, at 1 (noting that “the ensemble of accounting practices and
regulations in any one country at any given time are not representative of the present but are rather
an accumulation of past decisions which have been modified in response to many different stimuli
over a span of time”).
115
See Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 187 (noting that factory analogy provides the best
explanation of how the accounting system works).
116
Id. at 205.
117
See Walton, supra note 112, at 3 (noting incremental nature of accounting regulation).
118
See Arewa, Strategic Behavior, supra note 29.
119
The strategic intellectual property management literature is a body of works in the business
field that discusses the appropriate uses of intellectual property assets by companies. See infra
note 221 and accompanying text.
114
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significantly affected how businesses are organized and operate.120 More
specifically, the changes in business organizational structure and operational
strategy associated with the intangibles paradigm have implications for systems
that regulate business behavior.121 The full magnitude of the effects of intangibles
for business enterprises remains uncertain.122 Assessment of the nature and uses
of intangibles and the shift to the intangibles paradigm provide further evidence of
exactly how accounting and other regulatory systems fail to require disclosure of
information that accurately represents the economic reality of the intangibles
paradigm economy and business practices.
II.

THE INTANGIBLES “PARADIGM”: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF BUSINESS
INVESTMENT
Intangibles are inherently different from physical and financial assets.
Managerial and regulatory systems are slow to adapt to these differences,
resulting in widespread adverse private and social consequences. . . A
productive discourse on intangibles should be based on a thorough analysis
of the economics of intangibles, an understanding of the incentives and
motives . . . of the major players . . . and a careful empirical documentation
of the economic consequences of the rise of intangibles.123

A.

Accounting Systems and Business Organization
1. Tangibles paradigm Business Organization from an Historical
Perspective

One critical aspect of the shift to an intangibles paradigm is increased

120

See infra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text; see also Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23.
OECD, supra note 18, at 4 (“The development of intangible investments has been
complemented by the expansion of service activities and extensive organisational change.”); W.
Michael Cox & Richard Alm, The New Paradigm, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 1999
ANNUAL REPORT 11-23 (1999) (discussing organizational and other changes associated with ICT
era), at http://www.dallasfed.org/fed/annual/1999p/ar99.pdf; Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The
Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them 27, NYU Working Paper (Feb.
1999), at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/boundaries.doc (highlighting the fact that intangibles
are a major driver of business change).
122
OECD, supra note 18, at 10 (“Overall, public policy is hampered by lack of knowledge and
understanding of the extent and importance of intangible assets in enterprise strategies and
practices. Intangibles need to be measured, reported and accounted for more explicitly, to
strengthen their internal management and develop reliable external guides to their value for capital
markets and resource providers.”).
123
Lev, supra note 18, at 20.
121
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internalization of corporate transactions and sources of value.124 This
distinguishes the intangibles paradigm from business paradigms that have arisen
in the past. Accounting and bookkeeping systems developed to record
information relating to transactions and existed even in the ancient world.125 The
nature of the information that accounting systems need to explain may differ
depending on the dominant organizational paradigms of businesses that use such
systems. For example, before the nineteenth century, under a pre-industrial
business paradigm, the dominant forms of business organization tended to be
characterized by exchange transactions between owners-entrepreneurs and
external individuals involving raw material suppliers, piecework labor and
customers.126 In such a pre-factory system, a piece rate, or market-based price,
was paid for “the output of independent artisans or subcontractors who carried out
almost every process involved in the manufacture of a product.”127
With the tangibles paradigm that came to be ascendant during the Industrial
Revolution, business owners began to exploit economies of scale to achieve gain
and commit large sums of capital to production processes with an overall business
focus on accumulating physical capital.128 This led to a business focus on
managing hierarchical organizations rather than conducting all business through
market transactions and is exemplified in the dominant industrial factories that
emerged under that paradigm in the textile and steel industries, for example.129
124

See infra notes 282 to 290 and accompanying text. The importance of internally generated
intangibles is reflective of this phenomenon.
125
Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6.
126
Id. at 6, 19-21.
127
Id. at 22-23; see also JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (2002) (noting that, although large firms were widespread prior to the
Industrial Revolution, “most of their employees were domestic laborers (working in a cottage
industry).”).
128
Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6-7 (noting commitment of significant sums of capital to
production processes); Goldin, supra note 20, at 50 (noting focus on accumulation of physical
capital as characteristic of nineteenth century industrial production).
129
Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 7, 21-45; see also William L. Baldwin, The Corporation
and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional Approach, 27 VT. L. REV. 841, 843-844 (2003)
(discussing how dominant nineteenth century business models resulted in the demand for forms of
business organizations that could efficiently manage capital investments and technical economics
of scale and scope); see also John Richard Edwards & Edmund Newell, The Development of
Industrial Cost and Management Accounting before 1850: A Survey of the Evidence, 33 BUS.
HIST. 35, 38, 53 (1990) (placing the origins of industrial accounting in the cotton and metal
industries and suggesting that precursors of modern accounting frameworks are more varied than
is often stated); James Foreman-Peck, Accounting in the Industrialization of Western Europe, in
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A HISTORY 11-28 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (discussing the
relationship between the history of European accounting and economic history, noting that with
industrial capitalism, developments in accounting were dependent on the goals of management).
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The emergence of these structures under a tangibles paradigm changed the nature
of the accounting information that companies needed to operate.130 For example,
steel magnate Andrew Carnegie’s operating strategy enabled him to make profits,
even during economic recessions when he cut prices, and outlast competing firms
that went out of business.131 Management accounting, which entails use of
accounting information for planning, decision making and control, developed to
accommodate and support these “profit-seeking activities of entrepreneurs for
whom multiprocess, hierarchical, managed enterprises were more efficient than
conversion processes through continual transactions in the marketplace.”132
Nineteenth century managers of capital intensive companies thus made
“sophisticated use of accounting information to rationalize the operations of large
single-activity manufacturing concerns.”133
The history of the relationship between accounting systems and business
operations is thus one in which accounting frameworks have often adjusted to
meet the needs of changing business operational and organizational structures.
For example, the development of audited financial statements and auditing
procedures is closely linked to the increased need for companies to raise funds
from more widespread sources of outside capital.134 Current accounting
frameworks were basically fully formed by 1925.135 These frameworks have not
been fundamentally reassessed in light of the implications of the intangibles
paradigm,136 which is an important factor in the intangibles haze.137 The structure
and use of intangibles in contemporary business operations demonstrates how
130

Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that a need arose for measures “to determine
the ‘price’ of output from internal operations,” in order to determine profits).
131
Id. at 33-34 (noting that Carnegie’s strategy “[w]as to push his own direct costs below his
competitors’ so that he could charge prices that would always ensure enough demand to keep his
plants running at full capacity.”).
132
Edwards & Newell, supra note 129, at 39 (noting that management accounting may be
distinguished from cost accounting, which focuses on identification and accumulation of cost, and
financial accounting, which has the goal of providing accounting information to external parties).
133
Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 35.
134
Id. at 130 (noting that prior to 1900, although a few American industrial companies issued
periodic financial statements, virtually none of these financial reports were audited and that firms
were eventually able to tap outside resources by providing investors with audited financial
statements).
135
Id. at 12, 125.
136
Id. at 14 (“When cost systems became automated on digital computers, starting in the mid1960s, the system designers basically automated the manual systems they found in the factory.
Left unquestioned was whether these systems were still sensible given the great expansion in
information technology represented by electronic, digital computers and the already changed
nature of the organization’s operations.”).
137
See infra notes 265 to 331 and accompanying text.
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current accounting and disclosure frameworks function in today’s intangibles
oriented business and economic climate.
2. Virtual Business Organization: The Case of Cisco
The use of information systems by Cisco Systems, the world’s largest networking
equipment company, illustrates some of the organizational and operational effects
of engagement with the intangibles paradigm in the ICT sector. Cisco’s Internet
Protocol (IP)-based networking solutions form the foundation of many Internet
networks worldwide.138 Founded in 1984 by a group of Stanford computer
scientists, Cisco began operations as a company that made routers, physical
devices developed at Stanford University that join multiple computer networks
together.139 Cisco shipped its first product in 1986 and expanded its range of
product offerings in the 1990s to include switches, which are devices that join
multiple computers together. Cisco also grew at an extraordinary rate, with
annual revenues increasing from $70 million in 1990 to more than $18.9 billion in
2000140 and $24.8 billion in 2005.141
Cisco has created “a virtual organization that incorporates its suppliers and
business partners to make its value chain more efficient.”142 As part of its global
networked business model, Cisco supports its business strategy by making
extensive use of the Internet and e-commerce and integrates its customers,
suppliers, channel partners and service partners into its own information
systems.143 Cisco describes itself as a “business is based on a networked fabric of
communications and collaboration that uses Internet applications to improve
productivity, reduce time to market, increase revenue, and build relationships.”144
Cisco’s business strategy enabled it to automate routine customer questions
through use of the Internet and thus more effectively use the time of its engineers
138

Brit Wittman, Cisco Systems Puts its HR Programs and Processes On Line and Reaps Big
Productivity Gains, 23 J. ORG. EXCELLENCE 43, 43 (2003) (noting that Cisco IP solutions are the
“foundation of the Internet and most corporate, education and government networks around the
world”).
139
Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 5.
140
Id.
141
CISCO 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2005), at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ar2005/printable.html.
142
Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 26.
143
Id. at 17, 20.
144
CISCO 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2000), at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html.
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who could then spend time on more challenging technical questions.145 This
strategy also meant that Cisco could avoid a serious constraint on its growth that
would have resulted from engineers spending time on routine questions instead of
supporting Cisco’s sales of its core router and switch products.146 Rather than
hire new engineers or have existing engineers handle routine customer needs,
Cisco automated such requests, developing the Cisco Connection Online (CCO),
Cisco’s virtual organization that extends to all aspects of Cisco’s operations,
including internal operations.147 Cisco has a virtual finance organization (VFO)
that permits company management to view financial information through Webbased applications on a daily and hourly basis.148
Cisco also uses the Cisco Employee Connection (CEC), an Intranet, internally to
provide human resources information and support Cisco employees. Interactive
tools have been developed for facilities, travel arrangements, technical
documents, human resources, training, sales and marketing and financial
matters.149 Cisco has described itself as the “single largest user of e-commerce in
the world,”150 which reflects the pervasive use of information systems at Cisco. In
fiscal year 2000, 90% of Cisco’s $18.9 billion in sales came from online
purchases, and 82% of customer inquiries were handled online.151
Examination of Cisco’s financial statements in light of its extensive use of
intangibles and ICT technology in its organizational and operational structure
reveals one of the paradoxes of intangibles paradigm financial statements.
Cisco’s virtual organization is clearly a core aspect of the operation of Cisco’s
business both externally in relation to customers and internally with respect to
company organization and operations. The importance of Cisco’s virtual
organization is also discussed widely in commentary about the company and at
least mentioned in most discussions of the company’s business in financial and
other publications, for example.152
The place where extensive discussion of Cisco’s virtual organization is most
145

See Shawn Tully, How Cisco Mastered the Net, FORTUNE (Aug. 17, 1998).
Id.
147
See CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1998) (hereinafter, “CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT”), at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html (noting that Cisco began developing the CCO in 1993).
148
See Stephen F. Jablonsky, Cisco’s “Virtual” Finance Organization, 12 J. CORP. ACCOUNTING
& FIN. 29, 30-31 (2001).
149
See Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 20.
150
Id. at 22.
151
Id. at 22.
152
See supra notes 34, 138, 145 and 148 and accompanying text.
146
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noticeably lacking is in Cisco financial statements and its disclosure in reports and
SEC required filings in general. As a result, the costs of this virtual organization
are difficult to assess and evaluate from the perspective of such financial
statements and disclosure. This virtual organization is thus virtually unreflected
as a separate entry on Cisco’s balance sheet, income statement or in the notes to
Cisco’s financial statements because it is characterized by a high degree of
intangible resources.153 The expenditures Cisco has made with respect to this
virtual organization are likely contained within the General and Administrative
expenses of the Cisco income statement during the years that expenditures have
occurred in connection with the virtual organization.154 The exact nature and
amount of expenditures in building this virtual organization remain remarkably
unclear from the perspective of Cisco’s financial statements and other disclosure.
The absence of disclosure about Cisco’s intangibles investments is of particular
concern given the significance of the virtual organization for Cisco’s operations.
As a result of this lack of disclosure, the actual operation of this virtual
organization is not at all transparent. In fact, more is disclosed concerning this
critical aspect of Cisco’s operations in magazines and business articles on Cisco
than is typically evident in Cisco’s financial statements or other disclosure.155 The
role of the virtual organization at Cisco, including the CCO and CEC, is
comparable to the role that factories played with industrial companies operating
under tangibles paradigm business models. As was characteristic of the factory
153

Some of the costs of Cisco’s virtual organization may be reflected in the breakdown of net
property and equipment on Cisco’s balance sheet. For the fiscal year ended July 26, 2003, for
example, the total amount of computer equipment and related software carried on Cisco’s balance
sheet was approximately $1.15 billion out of total assets of $3.7 billion, as compared with $1.02
billion and $4.10 billion for the prior fiscal year. CISCO 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004), at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html. However, since Cisco has a history of making many acquisitions, some portion of the these
assets on its balance sheet may be a result of its accounting for acquisition transactions. The
allocation if the purchase price in an acquisition is reflected, for example, in the discussion of the
allocation of the purchase price of the January 1995 Cisco acquisition LightStream Corporation.
See CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 41. The allocation of the $120 million
LightStream purchase price was primarily for purchased research and development ($95.8
million), plant and equipment ($1.8 million) and goodwill ($19.7 million). Id. The remaining
purchase reflected cash, accounts receivable and other current assets. See infra notes 265 to 298
and accompanying text for a discussion of the accounting treatment of intangibles.
154
For example, the Management Discussion and Analysis portion of the Cisco 1997 Annual
Report suggests that at least some expenses connected to the development of information systems
are included in the General and Administrative Expenses portion of Cisco’s income statement,
noting:“The dollar increase reflects increased personnel costs necessary to support the Company’s
business infrastructure, including those associated with its new European Logistics Center, as well
as the further development of its information systems.” CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
147, at 25 (emphasis added).
155
See, e.g., supra notes 34 and 138 for articles discussing Cisco’s virtual organization.
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that was at the center of many tangibles paradigm business operations, the virtual
organizations involving information systems and other largely intangible and
internally generated resources developed by companies under the intangibles
paradigm are often critical to such companies’ business success as well as the
scalability of their operations.
The lack of disclosure concerning a fundamental aspect of Cisco’s operations is
remarkable when contrasted with accounting treatment of core tangible assets.
Existing financial statement reporting and SEC disclosure requirements reflect
tangibles paradigm assumptions by requiring specific disclosures with regard to
tangible assets.156 Comparable specific required disclosure does not exist with
respect to intangible resources. This means that existing frameworks do not
adequately delineate what may need to be modified such that required disclosures
may more fully and adequately represent economic reality under the intangibles
paradigm.157 Identifying how intangibles are used will help illustrate their
pervasive presence in business today and why the relative absence and lack of
transparency of internally developed intangibles in the financial statements of
companies such as Cisco may be problematic.
B.

Intangibles and Business Practice: The Uses of Intangible Resources
1. The Role of Intangibles

Intangibles play a growing role in American business and both the U.S. and
global economies.158 Market services and intangible goods now account for more
than two-thirds of U.S. GDP.159 Services increased from 22 percent of GDP in
1950 to some 39 percent in 1999.160 Intangibles are primary drivers in the postindustrial era and are increasingly important factors in wealth creation and
economic growth.161 Intangibles are also increasingly viewed by businesses as
critical to the enhancement of their competitive advantage and productivity.162
156

Item 102 of Regulation S-K (“Description of Property”), for example, requires specific
disclosures with respect to physical properties. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.102.
157
See infra notes 390 to 422 and accompanying text.
158
See supra notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text.
159
See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH 7 (2001).
160
Id. at 11. See also Margaret M. Blair, Gary M. Hoffman & Salvatore P. Tamburo, Clarifying
Intellectual Property Rights for the New Economy (2001), Georgetown University Law Center,
Working Paper No. 274038, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=274038; Croes, supra
note 13.
161
See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 17 (noting that ideas and technology deriving from such
ideas are primary long-term cause of economic growth, with information technology and the
manufacture of physical goods relating to such information technology boosting growth rates of
gross output by an estimated 1 percent per year); Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,
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At the same time as intangibles are becoming more important, the relevance of
financial statements is decreasing.163 When, as has been the case at companies
such as Cisco and Microsoft, a balance sheet includes assets that reflect only 5 to
10 percent of the market value of a company, reasonable questions may arise as to
the usefulness of such balance sheets as a source of information.164 The
effectiveness of balance sheets as measures of economic value is integrally
connected to the gap between market values and book values of assets.
2. The Market to Book Ratio: A Reflection of Intangibles?
In 1982, $62.30 of every $100 invested in stocks was spent on tangible assets,
while in 1992, only $37.90 of every $100 was spent on such assets,165 a decrease
of 39 percent during the course of the decade. One indicator seen as a marker of
the importance of intangibles as sources of business value for companies is the
divergence between two measures of company value: the market value of public
Market Economies and Rule of Law (Apr. 4, 2003), Financial Markets Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia (“Only in recent decades, as the economic product
of the United States has become so predominantly conceptual, have issues related to the protection
of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant sources of legal and business
uncertainty.”), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm;
Aboody & Lev, supra note 35, at 6-7 (noting that most corporate growth in last 20 to 30 years has
been generated by intangible assets in developing economies); The European Commission, ICT
Investment in the Intangible Economy §2.1, at http://www.ll-a.fr/euepsilon/resources/ict/home.htm (noting that average ICT growth rate between 1987 and 1994
almost twice that of world GDP growth rate).
162
Lev, supra note 18, at 11-20; The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (noting that
prime determinants of success today grounded in information and knowledge); Cañibano et al.,
supra note 41, at 5 (noting progressive movement in last two decades to knowledge-based
technology intensive economy in which investments in intangibles are an essential part of
competitive position and business viability and that efficient management of such knowledge is
major source of competitive advantage); Clark Eustace, New Modes of Competitive Advantage for
the Intangible Economy (Nov. 1999) (commenting that knowledge economy has led business
community to rethink relationship between intangibles and corporate performance because
intangibles are recognized as a prime source of competitive advantage, leading to strategic
deployment of intangibles as key business assets), at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/issues/intangibles/C_Eustace_full_pres.html; see also
JONATHAN LOW AND PAM COHEN KALAFUT, INVISIBLE ADVANTAGE: HOW INTANGIBLES ARE
DRIVING BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (2002).
163
See Eli Amir & Baruch Lev, Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial Information: The Wireless
Communications Industry, 22 J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 3 (1996) (noting a decline in value
relevance of financial statements); Jennifer Francis & Katherine Schipper, Have Financial
Statements Lost Their Relevance?, 37 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 319 (1999) (noting decline in
explanatory power of earnings statements).
164
See infra notes 168 to 188 and accompanying text.
165
Daum, supra note 65, at 4.
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companies as reflected in the companies’ stock prices and the book value of such
companies’ assets on their balance sheets.166 This gap between market value and
book value is at least partially associated with the value placed on companies’
intangibles by investors.167
CHART 1
Market-to-Book Ratio
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1973

1992

1999

2000

2002

Year

Sources: Lev, infra note 169; Lev, infra note 170.

166

Lev, supra note 18, at 31-33; PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, Introduction to Intellectual Capital
Management, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM
INNOVATION 4 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); THOMAS A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
295-296 (1998) (stating that gap actually measures the intensity of knowledge assets rather than
the relative amounts of intangibles versus tangible assets and is thus not an accurate measure of
intangibles because market values rise and fall with exuberance and book value is based on
historical cost while market value includes market valuation of future earnings).
167
See Sullivan, supra note 166, at 4; Lev, supra note 2, at 132 (noting that this gap also reflects
the difference between current and historical cost values of physical assets); J.B. Backhuijs,
W.G.M. Holterman, R.S. Oudman, R.P.M. Overgoor & S.M. Zijlstra, Reporting on Intangible
Assets 6, Final Report for the Benefit of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Intangible
Assets Pilot Project Sounding Board Group (June 9-10, 1999), at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/43/1947807.pdf.
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The trend during the intangibles era has been toward an increasing market to book
gap. As is evident in Chart 1 above, the ratio of market to book value, which
reflects this gap, progressively increased for Standard & Poors 500 (S&P 500)
companies from level of 0.81 in 1973 to 1.69 in 1992,168 which means that in
1973 the book value of assets recorded on balance sheets was actually greater
than the stock market values of these companies, constituting more than 120
percent of market value. By 1992, however, some 40 percent of total market
value of S&P 500 companies was not reflected in assets on their balance sheets.169
This ratio was 6.25 in 1999,170 suggesting that six of every seven dollars of
corporate market value was derived from knowledge assets,171 and reached its
peak of 7.5 in March 2000.172 Following market adjustments in 2000 and 2001,
the ratio was still 4.2 in August 2002,173 suggesting that over three-quarters of the
total market value of S&P 500 companies was not reflected in assets on their
balance sheets. Movement of the market to book value ratio reflects the fact that
intangibles are a significant and quite volatile aspect of corporate value today,174
and signals a fundamental shift in corporate and societal asset bases.175 Despite
the volatility of this measure and influence of at times exuberant broader market
movements, the numbers indicate a fundamental change in aggregate S&P 500
balance sheets since 1972. The magnitude of market to book gap is also reflected
in company specific numbers for both ICT and non-ICT companies.176 The

168

Prior to 1975, U.S. companies were permitted to capitalize research and development expenses.
See Aswath Damodaran, Research and Development Expenses: Implications for Profitability
Measurement and Valuation 3 (1999), Stern School of Business Working Paper, at
www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/R&D.pdf.
169
Baruch Lev, Remarks on the Measurement, Valuation and Reporting of Intangible Assets,
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 17 (Sept. 17, 2003).
170
S&P 500 companies account for 75 percent of the total assets in the U.S. economy. Baruch
Lev, Knowledge and Shareholder Value 2, (Jan. 2000), at
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/knowledge&shareholdervalue.doc.
171
Id.
172
Lev, supra note 169, at 17. The 2000 numbers also reflect public equity markets at their highest
value in recent years.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (discussing shift in the asset base of
companies and societies).
176
In early 1999, for example, the equity of Proctor & Gamble (P&G) had a market value of over
$121.7 billion. The amount of equity recorded on P&G’s balance sheet was $12.2 billion. Smith
& Parr, supra note 40, at 89. Since equity reflects a company’s net assets (or assets minus
liabilities), this suggests a significant gap between financial statement value and market valuations
of P&G. The P&G numbers highlight the significance of intangibles in companies outside the
ICT sector.
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magnitude of the gap between market and book value is, not surprisingly,
typically greater for ICT companies.177
In late 2000, even after a major market correction earlier in the year, stock prices
would have needed to decrease by two-thirds for the gap between market and
book value to disappear.178 This gap reflects the fact that intangibles are now a
major source of value for many companies in both the ICT and non-ICT sectors,
which gives evidence of the pervasiveness of intangibles for businesses today. In
addition, intangibles in recent years have accounted for more than 70 percent of
the total market value of companies in a wide range of industries, including
consumer goods, ICT, pharmaceuticals and entertainment at different times under
varied stock market conditions and valuations.179 Other measures may also be
used demonstrate the significance of intangibles under the intangibles
paradigm.180
177

In June 2000, after a significant correction in the value of technology stocks earlier that year,
Microsoft’s net physical and financial assets were still less than 10 percent of its market value, and
Cisco’s physical and financial assets constituted 5 percent of its market value. Lev, supra note 18,
at 31. In early August 2000, The Walt Disney Company had a market capitalization of $117
billion, but only $43.7 billion in balance sheet assets (including $11.3 billion in recognized
intangible assets carried on Disney’s balance sheet), giving it some $85 billion in value
attributable to intangibles. Blair & Wallman, supra note 158, at 12. For Sprint Corp., the gap in
August 2000 was close to $31 billion, with a market capitalization of $60.2 billion and financial
statement assets of $39 billion (including $9.6 billion in recognized intangibles). Id. Net assets of
SAP, the German enterprise resource planning and e-business software company, were only 4.6
percent of SAP’s market value as of December 31, 1999. Daum, supra note 65, at 5.
178
Blair & Wallman, supra note 158, at 12.
179
Intangibles are the predominant source of value for a wide range of companies. The
percentages below represent the percent of total company stock market value attributable to
intangibles based on the company’s market value as of the stated date: The Walt Disney Company
(70.9%, September 1998), H.J. Heinz Company (89.6%, April 1998), Johnson & Johnson (87.9%,
December 1998), Merck & Company (93.5%, September 1998), Microsoft Corporation (97.8%,
June 1998), Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) (71.8%, December 1998), Philip Morris
Companies (78.8%, December 1998), Nike, Inc. (76.0%, May 1998), Proctor & Gamble Company
(88.5%, September 1997), Yahoo! Inc. (98.9%, December 1998). See Smith & Parr, supra note
40, at 123-149. Similarly, in 1986, Merck’s book value was 12.3 percent of its market value,
while in 1996, Coca-Cola’s book assets were 5 percent of its market value and Microsoft’s just 6
percent. In 2001, Cisco’s book value was 25 percent of its market value, while GE’s book assets
were 10 percent of its market value. See Jeremy Galbreath, Twenty-First Century Management
Rules: The Management of Relationships as Intangible Assets, 40 MGMT DESIGN 116, 117 (2002).
180
Tobin’s q is one such measure. Tobin’s q, developed by Nobel prize winning economist James
Tobin, is the ratio of the stock market value of a firm to the replacement value of the firm’s capital
assets. As such, it indirectly measures the rate of return of an asset. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin
M. Hitt, Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and
Business Performance, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 34 (2000); see also Steven R. Bond & Jason G.
Cummins, The Stock Market and Investment in the New Economy: Some Tangible Facts and
Intangible Fictions, in INTANGIBLE ASSETS 95, 96 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003).
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Underlying the book to market gap is the operation of the intangibles paradigm.
Although the market to book ratio suggests that intangibles may be undervalued
by markets, the picture is actually a bit more complex. The market to book gap
reflects a persistent failure under the intangibles paradigm for financial reporting
and other corporate disclosures to represent adequately and consistently the
economic reality of business operations under the intangibles paradigm. In some
instances, investments in intangibles by some companies may be undervalued, but
in others companies may be overvalued.181 Market trends may further obscure
individual company valuations as well. The bull market at the end of the 1990s
may, for example, have been associated with markets overvaluing intangibles,
which is likely reflected in the 7.5 market to book ratio number in March 2000.
The fact that the market may have overvalued intangibles in aggregate during the
height of the bubble does not, however, obscure the operation of the intangibles
paradigm or the fact that markets may in the case of individual companies either
undervalue or overvalue the contribution of intangibles.
The market to book gap does, however, suggest that existing disclosure standards
for intangibles are not adequate and too often result in distorted and inaccurate
company financial statements and disclosures that do not match economic
reality.182 This ultimately means that markets and investors may not always have
information that would enable them to value the contribution of intangibles to
companies consistently across different companies. Since one goal of financial
statements is to provide for the fair presentation of financial data that can be also
compared between firms and industries,183 the development of disclosure
mechanisms on the financial reporting and securities regulation fronts are
important avenues for dealing with the operation of the intangibles paradigm.184
As a result of this paradigm shift, financial statements have become less
informative from an accounting and economic perspective.185 One example of
this is the diminishing extent to which balance sheets describe the sources from
which companies derive value. If balance sheets reflected the entire value
attributed to company by financial markets, the book value of assets should not
diverge significantly from the company’s stock market value. In a strongly
181

See infra notes 404 to 421 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 265 to 316 and accompanying text.
183
See Shorter, supra note 46, at 2 (“GAAP are guidelines and rules for use by accountants in
preparing financial statements, that have evolved over years, and are designed to help ensure that
financial data are presented fairly and are comparable from firm to firm and from industry to
industry”).
184
See infra notes 390 to 421 to and accompanying text.
185
Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 5; Lev, supra note 18, at 99-101; Lev & Zarowin, supra note
121.
182
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efficient stock market, the market value of a company always equals its
fundamental value.186 Although, stock markets are not strongly efficient, the
extent to which the market value of a company equals its fundamental economic
value may be an indicator of the manner in which the market responds to
information concerning a company as well as the extent to which fundamental
economic reality is reflected or not reflected in resulting market valuations, all of
which are closely tied to company representations, accounting presentations and
disclosure. The reasons for the increasing divergence between market values and
book values are rooted in the fact that accounting treatment for intangible and
tangible assets is significantly different.187 The economic uncertainty associated
with intangibles is also typically greater than for physical assets.188 The economic
uncertainty of intangibles is magnified by the influence of company presentations
of financial results, particularly in the current business milieu in which intangibles
are increasingly predominant. Such presentations take on added significance
given the potentially significant flexibility that companies may have to present
their economic reality. This is particularly true since existing regulatory
structures have not fully adapted to the economic reality of the knowledge
economy.
C.

Presentation and Performance: Company Framing Choices and Audience
Impressions
1. Dramaturgical Aspects of Company Presentations

How businesses present themselves in different contexts is an important aspect of
business behavior and practice. Business presentations are in fact often heavily
context dependent. In fact, presentation opportunities represent points at which a
company may demonstrate performance variations in its choice of the type, nature
and content of its discourse and disclosure. Performance in the business context
is reflected in the activity of individual representatives who speak on behalf of a
business, as well as documents issued on behalf of or with respect to the
company. Such performances may be seen as encompassing specific contexts of
activity on behalf of or with respect to a company that occur “during a period
marked by . . . continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which
has some influence on the observers.”189
186

Bond & Cummins, supra note 180, at 96.
See infra notes 268 to 298 and accompanying text; Lev, supra note 18, at 79-103.
188
See Lev, supra note 18, at 41-42, 82; Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, Intangible Assets: Measurement,
Drivers, Usefulness 2-3, Working Paper #2003-05, Boston University School of Management, at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangible-assets.doc.
189
See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF THE SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22 (1959).
187
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The individuals who comprise management are typically the principal actors
involved in such performances, reflecting the established social roles that are
expected in the business context. Such established social roles would include,
among others, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board of
Directors, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO) and
other management positions. These roles are certainly not identical from
company to company and individuals in these roles do have some ability to define
their roles in the course of performance. Despite this, general societal and
business expectations do typically exist as to the nature of these roles and their
responsibilities. In addition, individuals in these roles may have a variety of
“fronts” from which to choose.190
Such performance choices exist on a different plane than is typically envisaged in
discussions about compliance with securities disclosure requirements or
accounting rules. At one end of the spectrum, however, when such performances
constitute fraud or a material misrepresentation, they implicate potentially serious
legal and accounting compliance concerns. However, within this spectrum, as a
result of the available range of choices, potentially many modes of presentation
exist that a company might use to represent economic reality within the context of
existing accounting and legal disclosure requirements.191 How and in what
manner a company frames itself within such rules and regulations is thus
important and potentially flexible depending on the context of presentation. Such
framing is most evident in the choices companies make about how to present
themselves both internally and externally.
The individuals in the management of a start-up company seeking venture capital
financing, for example, may use different discourse when speaking with
prospective venture capital investors than they might use with regard to existing
investors or even potential strategic partners. This discourse may reflect the
selection of a “front” or the “part of the individual’s performance which regularly
functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who
observe the performance.”192 This reflects the fact that businesses often target
such presentations or performances to suit the nature and expectations of the
anticipated audience. As such, business presentations have dramaturgical
190

Id.; see also infra note 193 and accompanying text.
Cf. RICHARD BAUMAN, A WORLD OF OTHERS’ WORDS: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERTEXTUALITY 124 (2004) (“[F]or the productiveness of considering performance not as any
doing of an oral literary text, but as one of the range of interactionally defined presentation modes,
or frames, which may be more or less functionally dominant in any act of spoken communication
or at any given point during its course.”).
192
Goffman, supra note 189, at 22.
191
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elements. Moreover, such presentations are ones in which “the individual infuses
his activity with signs which dramatically heighten and portray confirmatory facts
that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual’s
activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it
will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey.”193 For example, in
the case of a representative of a business giving a presentation, the business
person, by operating in a certain manner or mode, seeks to create a particular
impression on the part of the audience.194 The creation of such impressions is an
important aspect of the process by which corporations communicate in
interpretable ways with various audiences in varied contexts.195
The impression that the person making the presentation seeks to evoke may have
a significant influence on how the presentation is received by the audience. By
initiating a presentation seeking a particular impression, the presenter thus
“implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered
before them.”196 Face-to-face meetings and other contexts in which companies
make presentations suggest that contextually determined self-presentation is an
important factor in how businesses create a particular impression of the company
and its operations. Such business presentations highlight the fact that businesses
choose elements for a particular characterization of the company in a particular
context from a potentially wide range of choices. The dramaturgical aspects of
company presentations thus suggest that companies have some ability to define
the context within which they represent a particular economic reality. Such
framing may have a potentially significant impact on how a particular
representation of reality is both received and accepted.
2. Variations in Performance: The Implications of Presentation
Choices
Company presentations may exhibit significant variations in both the style and
content of performance in different contexts. Companies may, for instance, have
characteristic internal presentations to employees or senior managers, for
example, which may differ from external presentations, as well as varying
presentations among different internal constituencies. The documentary film

193

Id. at 30.
Id. at [17].
195
See Bauman, supra note 191, at 123 (noting that performance rests on two dimensions of
communicative competence: “knowledge and the ability to communicate in socially appropriate
and interpretable ways”).
196
Goffman, supra note 189, at 17.
194
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Startup.com,197 for example, illustrates this point clearly. This film contrasts
internal presentations to employees by the Chief Executive Officer of
GovWorks.com, the Internet startup depicted in the film, with meetings with
external audiences, particularly venture capital firms. It also illustrates some
potential differences in presentation between internal company-wide meetings and
internal meetings of senior managers.
It is thus quite typical for senior management and those empowered to speak on
behalf of companies to present entirely different portraits of the company for
varied purposes and in different contexts.198 Such variances in presentations do
not necessarily involve deception but may merely involve selective emphasis of
relevant factors relating to a particular economic or business reality targeted to a
particular audience or forum. In addition to face-to-face meetings, businesses
also engage in such presentations to varied audiences through the medium of
business documents such as annual reports, required SEC disclosure and by
means of financial statements. Businesses also engage in presentations in other
contexts such as web casts, newspaper and television coverage and analyst calls,
for example.
One potential limitation on a company’s ability to engage in differential
presentations for different audiences is legal requirements regarding company
disclosures imposed by the SEC. Disclosures, particularly for companies subject
to SEC periodic reporting requirements, could potentially subject a company to
liability under securities laws that incorporate GAAP accounting standards that
govern how particular transactions may be measured and reported.199 The recent
SEC Regulation FD is an explicit recognition of the fact that businesses may
make different presentations and may disclose different information to different
audiences. Regulation FD, which became effective in October 2000, addresses

197

See STARTUP.COM (Artisan Entertainment 2001).
Different books for book and tax purposes are one example of this phenomenon. See e.g.,
Luppino, supra note 100 (discussing divergent tax and accounting treatment of synthetic leases);
see also supra notes 100 to 111 and accompanying text.
199
The Exchange Act, for example, imposes periodic reporting requirements on companies with
securities registered under the Exchange Act (e.g., Reports on Form 10-K and Reports on Form
10-Q). 15 U.S.C. §78m (2003). The Exchange Act and rules promulgated under the Exchange Act
also contain anti-fraud provisions that govern disclosures made by all companies in the course of
selling securities. See Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005) (imposing securities law
liabilities for any untrue statement or omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading).
198
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selective disclosure by companies to analysts.200 Regulation FD provides that
companies disclosing material nonpublic information to securities market
professionals (e.g., analysts) must also make public disclosure of such
information.201 Regulation FD was proposed by the SEC as a result of a concern
about selective disclosure of certain information to institutional investors and
analysts before such information was disclosed to the general public.202
Rules governing disclosures do not, however, fully address the phenomenon of
contextual framing that may create a particular impression within which company
representations of economic reality may be received and accepted. As a result,
although guidelines primarily in the form of SEC rules and regulations such as
Regulation FD exist with respect to disclosure in general, companies have
flexibility particularly in face-to-face presentations as well as in written
documents. Business documents, for example, are not all identical and different
companies clearly have different styles of presentation.
The styles of presentation for a particular company may change over time as a
reflection of changing business strategy, changing external conditions or other
factors. It is not at all uncommon, for example, for a new CEO coming to a
company to make changes in business strategy from prior management.203 The
recent selection of a new CEO at Delta underscores how this process may occur.
The new CEO of Delta has presented himself as a change in direction from prior
management, despite the fact that he served as a member of the Delta board of
directors for 17 years.204 Such strategic changes are often underscored by how
new management chooses to present the company and its business strategy in
face-to-face and other contexts of performance. This presentation process
essentially entails framing the company within the broader business context.

200

Regulation FD, 17 CFR §243.100-243.103 (2005); Final Rule—“Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 2000 SEC LEXIS ___ (Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter “Regulation FD Release”].
201
Regulation FD Release, supra note 200, at ___.
202
Id. at ___.
203
See infra notes 230 to 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of changing business
strategy at IBM.
204
See Evan Perez, With Delta Reeling, Chief Plans Unusual Bet on Premium Routes, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 16, 2004), at A1, A6 (noting that new Delta CEO “in talks with the rank and file . . . has
criticized prior management’s mistakes and presented himself as a sharp departure, despite having
been a Delta director for the past 17 years,” and commenting that “[p]erhaps Mr. Grinstein’s most
remarkable achievement has been to convince many employees that he represents a clear departure
from prior management – no small feat given his many years as a powerful board member.”).
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The shift to the intangibles paradigm reveals at times sharp delineation in the
content of company self-presentations as companies seek to characterize
economic reality and their business strategies as incorporating intangibles and
existing within what might be termed intangibles paradigm discourse. The
primary audience for such presentations is financial markets and market
participants such as investment managers, investment bankers, analysts and
others. The Internet bubble in the stock market in the late 1990s also resulted in a
great deal of media attention being directed toward companies, both technology
start-up and other companies.205
The proliferation of media coverage and advertising concerning the economy,
stock market, business and specific companies indicates a broadening of the
potential audiences to which businesses might direct their presentations.206
Expanding stock ownership has also increased the size of the potential audience
for such presentations.207 This expansion in both financial media coverage and
the audience receiving such news was particularly evident during the Internet
bubble when technology analysts such as Mary Meeker and Henry Blodgett
received extensive media attention.208 Significant media attention was also
directed toward companies themselves, including startups, many of which had no
track record and limited operations. In the film Startup.com, for example, the

205

See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 41, Winter 2001; Angel Arrese & Mercedes Medina, Competition Between New
and Old Media in Economic and Financial News Markets 6, Working Paper, University of
Navarra, Pamplona, Spain, available at
http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://www.tukkk.fi/mediagroup/5WMEC%2520PAPERS
/Arrese%2520%26%2520Medina.pdf (analyzing the changing competitive environment of the
economic and financial news sector and noting the renewed preeminence of economic, business
and financial information since the 1990s).
206
M. Emmison, The Economy: Its Emergence in Media Discourse, in LANGUAGE, IMAGE AND
MEDIA (H. Davis & P. Walton eds. 1983); Richard Parker, The Revolution in America’s Financial
Industry: How Well Is the Press Covering the Story? 5, Money, Markets and the News:
Monograph 3, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (discussing the framing and presentation of
news about the financial services industry), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/shorenstein/Research_Publications/Reports/Parkerpaperfinal.PDF.
207
Bill Saporito, The Business Century: How the Economy Became Hot News in the Last 100
Years, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 1999), at 48-51 (discussing how expanding stock
ownership increased the demand for financial reporting and financial information), available at
http://archives.cjr.org/year/99/2/business.asp.
208
John Schwartz, Enron’s Collapse: The Analyst, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at C8; Landon
Thomas, Jr., As Technology Stock Climb, It Starts to Feel Like the 90’s All Over Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at C1.
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CEO of the company made multiple media appearances, which presented
additional opportunities for framing the company.209
As a result of the proliferation of business and financial media coverage through
traditional old media sources and new avenues such as the Internet, the audience
that businesses might reach through such presentations is increasingly expanding
to include a broader segment of the general public.210 This broadening media
attention provides additional opportunities for framing and further reinforces the
multicontextual aspects of business presentations and framing that reproduce
certain aspects of business worldview and practice that have emerged or
intensified under the intangibles paradigm.
D.

A New Business Paradigm: Business Worldview and Practice under the
Intangibles Paradigm
1. The Intangibles Paradigm Shift
a.

Paradigm Shifts from a Kuhnian Perspective

The intangibles paradigm shift is a profoundly important reorientation reflective
of the post-industrial context within which businesses operate.211 This
fundamental paradigm shift involves business practice and worldview.212 Thomas
209

See Startup.com, supra note 197.
Arrese & Medina, supra note 205, at 6-12 (noting that trends in the media world led to new
stardom for economic and financial news in broadcasting and electronic media, evident, for
example, in the emergence of channels specialized in economic and financial news such as FNN,
CNBC, CNNfn, Bloomberg Information Television and European Business News and websites
devoted to economic and financial issues); Andy Serwer, I Want My CNBC, FORTUNE (May 24,
1999), at 139-141; Richard Tomlinson, There’s an All-Out War to Report on Our Financial Times,
FORTUNE (Nov. 27, 2000) (discussing the Financial Times expansion to the U.S. market and the
expansion of financial media coverage), at 72; Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience, The
Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, Jun. 11, 2000 (noting that the rapid emergence
of the Internet as a news source that is attracting key segments of the national audience), available
at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=36; Enrique Dans, Internet Newspapers.
Are Some More Equal Than Others?, 2 INT’L J. OF MEDIA MGMT 4, 4 (2000) (discussing the
expansion of news available on the Internet and the consumer response to Internet news),
available at http://www.mediajournal.org/modules/pub/download.php?id=mediajournal69&user=&pass=; WAYNE PARSONS, THE POWER OF THE FINANCIAL PRESS: JOURNALISM AND
ECONOMIC OPINION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (Rutgers 1990).
211
See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern
Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 356 (1990) (commenting on emergence of a new
“techno-economic regime based on computer and communications innovation” that is
“supplanting the mature, ossified Fordist regime of mass production.”).
212
Paul B. Westberg & Patrick H. Sullivan, In Search of a Paradigm in PROFITING FROM
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 59, 59-75 (Patrick H. Sullivan
210
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Kuhn’s model of normal science and the scientific revolutions associated with
paradigm shifts in the sciences can be used to illuminate the processes that have
characterized the shift to an intangibles paradigm in business.213 From Kuhn’s
perspective, the history of science can be described as a process of destructiveconstructive paradigm changes involving periods of normal science characterized
by widespread acceptance of a certain paradigm or accepted model or pattern.214
Such paradigms, however, typically do not account for all aspects of the
observable phenomena that they seek to explain, giving rise to what Kuhn calls
“anomalies.”215 In such anomalies are the seeds of the crises leading to scientific
revolutions that Kuhn sees as typifying the shift to new paradigms. Kuhn
theorizes that certain scientists, typically those who are either younger or new to a
given field and thus less permeated with ideas linked with current paradigms,216
are associated with initiating paradigm shifts through their examination of and
attempts to explain anomalies in existing paradigms. Because existing paradigms
do not explain such anomalous characteristics, new paradigms develop to
explicate what could not be explained under the old paradigm.217 Such new
paradigms also contain within them the anomalous characteristics that may be the
basis for future paradigm shifts.
b.

The Metaphysical and Sociological Aspects of the
Intangibles Paradigm

In contrast to paradigm shifts in the scientific community, which are precipitated
by changing perceptions of external conditions, the shift to an intangibles
paradigm in the business context is probably best seen as precipitated by changes
in external conditions and underlying economic reality, particularly the
ed., 1998) (discussing generally the Kuhnian paradigm concept in relation to knowledge
companies); The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (discussing structural shift in mode
of corporate wealth creation to knowledge based model whose defining trend is shift from tangible
to intangible factors of production, which has led to a shift in the asset base of companies and
societies).
213
See Kuhn, supra note 17; see also Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics in CRITICISM
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 231, 266-277 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970)
(discussing the multiple meanings of paradigm in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).
214
Kuhn, supra note 17, at 23, 66, 96 (describing normal research as a cumulative process).
215
Kuhn notes, for example, that a paradigm is a theory that is better than its competitors, but that
not necessarily and “in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” Id.
at 17-18. An anomaly “opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the
initially anomalous has become the anticipated.” Id. at 64.
216
Id. at 90. (noting that “[a]lmost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a
new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they
change”).
217
Id. at 92.
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competitive environment in which businesses operate and the changes associated
with globalization, deregulation and increased competition.218 Although Kuhn
uses the term paradigm in many different senses in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, his uses of paradigm as metaphysical and sociological constructions
are most relevant to consideration of the intangibles paradigm in business.219 The
term paradigm as used herein, does not in any way imply an acceptance of the
entirety of Kuhn’s model of the development of normal science in a business
context. However, at the core of the intangibles paradigm is a fundamental
change in the nature of and perceptions of the milieu in which businesses operate
in the post-industrial era knowledge economy. These changing perceptions have
been closely associated with changing external conditions, and involve both
metaphysical aspects relating to worldview and sociological aspects evident in
changing business practice. Such changes have been accompanied by
transformations in discussions about business organization and practice. One
example of this are changes in the actual language companies use to describe their
incorporation of intangibles as well as company framing and descriptions of
changes in business practices associated with the intangibles paradigm shift.
The metaphysical aspects of the shift to an intangibles paradigm are illustrated by
changing worldviews concerning the sources from which businesses derive their
primary value.220 One important reflection of the development of the intangibles
paradigm worldview is the proliferating strategic intellectual property business
literature that has developed under the intangibles paradigm. This literature
includes a myriad of books and articles that discuss the importance of intangibles
for business from a strategic and value creation perspective.221 This literature
218

Lev, supra note 18, at 8-13 (noting that globalization, deregulation and increased competition
are factors in the increasing predominance of intangibles).
219
Margaret Masterman and George Ritzer, in particular, have discussed Kuhn’s uses of the term
paradigm and classified his uses into broad categories, the most significant of which are the
metaphysical and sociological aspects of a paradigm. The terms metaphysical and sociological
paradigm come from Margaret Masterman’s comprehensive and thorough discussion of the nature
and uses of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm concept. See Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a
Paradigm in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 59, 65 (Imre Lakatos & Alan
Musgrave eds., 1970) (distinguishing between metaphysical paradigms, sociological paradigms
and construct paradigms); see also GEORGE RITZER, SOCIOLOGY: A MULTIPLE PARADIGM
SCIENCE 4-6 (rev. ed. 1980) (subsuming three types of paradigm identified by Masterman under
rubric of metaphysical paradigm).
220
The market to book gap, for example, gives evidence of the fundamental changes in sources of
value for businesses. See supra notes 165 to 188 and accompanying text.
221
The core works in this body of works were originally published in the 1980s and 1990s. See,
e.g., Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV.
BUS. REV. 8 (Jan.-Feb. 2000); JULIE L. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE
BOARDROOM (2001); KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:
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reflects the strategic importance of intangible assets to businesses and is likely a
factor in and illustrative of the increasing recognition of the significance of
intangibles and value attributed to intangibles by markets and firms. This
literature thus plays a role comparable to that attributed to textbooks, lectures and
laboratory exercises by Kuhn in tending to reveal the nature and contents of
underlying paradigms.222
This increasing recognition about the economic reality of intangibles for
businesses reflects the extent to which the shift to an intangibles paradigm
represents a change in worldview or “new way of seeing.”223 This new
worldview is partly driven by the fact that intangibles are fundamentally different
from tangible assets, particularly in relation to boundaries. In the tangible asset
context, boundaries are easier to draw because the tangibility of a product with a
physical embodiment makes establishment and reinforcement of boundaries
around the product more clear-cut.224
The sociological and metaphysical aspects of the intangibles paradigm shift are
clearly interrelated. It is, however, useful to separate them conceptually, which
can contribute to understanding the dynamic processes by which the shift to an
UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS (2000); Suzanne Harrison & Kevin Rivette, The IP
Portfolio as a Competitive Tool in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE
FROM INNOVATION 119-128 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Patrick H. Sullivan, Extracting Value
from Intellectual Property in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE
FROM INNOVATION 103-118 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Patrick H. Sullivan, Extracting Value
from Intellectual Assets in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM
INNOVATION 173-185 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Gordon Petrash, Intellectual Asset
Management at Dow Chemical in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE
FROM INNOVATION 205-220 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Lori Morrison & Paul Germeraad,
Intellectual Asset Management at Avery Dennison in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 221-241 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Kari Laento,
Intellectual Asset Management at Nestle in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 242-252 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Leif Edvinsson,
Managing Intellectual Capital at Skandia in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 279-283 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); ROBERT S.
KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, STRATEGY MAPS: CONVERTING INTANGIBLE ASSETS INTO
TANGIBLE OUTCOMES (2004). In these pieces, varied terminology is used to describe intangible
assets in the accounting and business literature. Terms used include intellectual capital,
knowledge assets and human capital. See Lev, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing terminology);
Sullivan, supra note 166 (discussing terminology), at 5; Westberg & Sullivan, supra note 212, at
63 (giving timeline of events in the intellectual capital business strategy movement).
222
See Kuhn, supra note 17, at 43.
223
Kuhn, supra note 17, at 117-121 (noting that textbooks, lectures and laboratory exercises reveal
the nature and contents of underlying paradigms); see also Masterman, supra note 213, at 76-79;
Ritzer, supra note 213, at 4-10.
224
See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 for a discussion of intangibles and boundaries.
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intangibles paradigm has occurred. Particularly relevant here is how worldview
changes have translated sociologically into changes in the behavior of individuals
and firms. Under the intangibles paradigm, a fundamental change in sociological
orientation has also occurred with respect to how many companies operate on a
day-to-day basis.225 The organizational practices evident in Cisco’s CCO, CEC
and VFO reflect these changes.226 On a sociological level, the intangibles
paradigm shift is most evident in the changes in organizational structure and
practices of businesses associated with the intangibles era.227 Although the
intangibles paradigm is broader and includes changes other than those connected
to the ICT economy, many of these sociological changes involve the
incorporation of intangibles, including ICTs, into companies and insertion of
companies in the context of the ICT economy. Cisco and Wal-Mart are examples
of companies who have successfully done this and who are at the forefront of
incorporating intangibles and ICTs into their business organization and
practices.228
c.

Business Representations, Corporate Documents and the
Intangibles Paradigm

Both metaphysical and sociological components of the intangibles paradigm shift
are evident in the framing in corporate documents such as annual reports that
position companies and describe corporate strategies and actions taken. A marked
shift began at the end of the twentieth century in how companies describe
themselves in terms of the conceptualization and utilization of intangible
resources and other factors associated with the intangibles paradigm.
Corporate annual reports are useful documents for assessing the impact of the
intangibles paradigm on business worldview and practice. They also provide
evidence for the penetration of intangibles paradigm discourse in the business
context by framing and positioning companies in two ways. Companies position
themselves within the intangibles paradigm and discuss the role and integration of
intangibles and ICTs within in companies. The proliferation of ecommerce and
225

See e.g., Daum, supra note 65. In Kuhn’s usage, these sociological changes would be
analogous to a concrete set of habits or an accepted judicial precedent. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 10,
23 (“. . .like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation
and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”); see also Ritzer, supra note 219, at 46.
226
See supra notes 138 to 156 and accompanying text.
227
See Kuhn, supra note 17, at 18 (recognizing that the emergence of a new paradigm affects
organizational structures).
228
See infra notes 384 to 395 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wal-Mart and supra
notes 138 to 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cisco.
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Internet terminology in company documents such as annual reports in the late
1990s illustrates this point. My review of company annual reports showed that
prior to the collapse of the Internet bubble, a broad range of companies used
language in annual reports and other disclosure documents derived from and
related to the experience of ICT, ecommerce and Internet companies. Following
the collapse of the Internet bubble, Internet-related terminology decreased,
although general references to ICTs remained evident. Corporate annual reports
and other documents generated by companies are also instructive in that they
reflect a company’s presentation of itself to public markets and investors.229
IBM is an example of a company that used changing discourse and framing to
highlight and sell a new business strategy to markets that were skeptical about its
future. Despite its extensive patent portfolio and status as a leading technology
company, in 1993, on the arrival of a new CEO, Louis Gerstner, IBM had
declining revenues, earnings and stock price,230 reflecting the fact that it was
viewed as being inbred and ingrown.231 IBM was able to reverse course and
successfully implement new technology strategies.232 As part of this process,
IBM embedded itself within intangibles paradigm discourse. The 1994 IBM
Annual Report is particularly notable because it describes 1994 as the year that
the new IBM emerged.233 In its 1994 Annual Report, IBM focuses on
information technology, noting that information technology would revolutionize
society.234 The 1994 IBM Annual Report emphasizes placing IBM within the
context of what IBM terms the technology revolution.235 IBM’s use of language
in the 1994 Annual Report typifies intangibles paradigm discourse.
Non-ICT intensive companies also evidence an intangibles discourse that
emphasizes the importance of intangibles and ICTs in general and the specific
applications of such technologies in specific business contexts. Wal-Mart reflects
this phenomenon. After virtually no mention of intangibles, ICTs or related terms
in Annual Reports since 1970, in the mid-1990s, Wal-Mart began to emphasize
the integration of the company under the intangibles paradigm, and the integration
229

See infra notes 189 to 209 and accompanying text.
DOUG GARR, IBM REDUX: LOUIS GERSTNER AND THE BUSINESS TURNAROUND OF THE DECADE
19-20 (2000) (noting a plunge in IBM’s stock price of 30 percent between 1990 and 1993 and loss
of $6 billion in market capitalization).
231
In addition, IBM was suffering a liquidity crisis. See Lisa DiCarlo, How Gerstner Got IBM to
Dance, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/11/11/cx_ld_1112gerstner.html.
232
Id.; Garr, supra note 230.
233
Chairman’s Letter, IBM 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
234
Id. at 4.
235
Id. IBM Annual Reports from 1994 to present are available at
http://www.ibm.com/investor/financials/annualreport.phtml.
230
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of intangibles and ICT technologies in the company. The former is reflected in
statements such as “Wal-Mart leads industry in technology and not slowing
down” and the latter in statements such as “[w]ith this technology, we’re getting
better, quicker and more accurate information to manage and control every aspect
of our business . . .”236
2. Intangibles Paradigm Discourse: Strategic Behavior and the
Strategic Intellectual Property Management Literature
a.

Intangibles, Strategic Behaviors and Business
Transformations

Intangibles paradigm discourse reflects business practices and strategic behaviors
with respect to intangibles. Intangibles are a major source of value for companies
today in varied business sectors and industries.237 In addition to discussing how
intangibles should be used strategically and often offensively,238 the strategic
intellectual property management literature provides guidance about how
companies can assess and measure intangibles and create organizational structures
that best enable exploitation of intangibles.239
One focus of this discussion is how intangibles can be commoditized or
monetized and translated into major sources of corporate value.240 This literature
is more than a hypothetical discussion; as Enron and Cisco demonstrate in quite
different ways, the uses of intangibles in actuality and in representations have real
consequences for company stockholders, company employees and investors,
among others. The actual incorporation of intangibles into business operations
and practices is often expensive and may also require significant initial
investment.241 In the case of ICTs, for example, such incorporation requires
236
WAL-MART 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 13. Wal-Mart annual reports from 1970 to present are
available at
http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/Mainnews.jsp?pagetype=news&categoryOID=
-8775&template=DisplayAllContents.jsp. My review of the company’s annual reports found that
such statements became more evident in Wal-Mart Annual Reports after the mid-1990s. For
further discussion of Wal-Mart and the intangibles paradigm, see infra notes 384 to 395 and
accompanying text.
237
See supra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text.
238
See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 (discussing strategic business uses of
intangibles).
239
Id.; see also supra notes 119 and 221.
240
See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29. The commoditization and monetization of
assets was also a core feature of Enron’s strategy. See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying
text.
241
See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 40; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 180.
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significant time for implementation and training of personnel or customers who
might use ICT products that are integrated into company processes and standard
practices. An actual transition to intangibles paradigm business practices thus
involves far more than discourse. 242 Current disclosure requirements, however,
because they do not adequately reflect the economic reality of the intangibles
paradigm, do not require provision of information that would enable better
verification of the actual reality of a company’s transition to intangibles paradigm
business practices as opposed to a company’s representations of this reality.243
The transformations in business practice associated with the intangibles paradigm
also have an external dimension. As a result, one aspect of the intangibles
paradigm and ICT era has been the development of at times cartel-like formations
of industries that have grown in the shadow of intellectual property rules.244
Inadequate disclosure standards for intangibles may also influence company
behavior and force companies to use signaling to convey the value they derive
from intangibles.245 This is particularly the case since current accounting and
disclosure standards do not adequately measure the value of intangibles.
Consequently, as a result of differential accounting treatment of intangibles and
the inadequacy of current measurement and disclosure standards with respect to
intangibles,246 companies with significant amounts of intangible assets “face the
rather formidable task of credibly signaling firm value to investors and
shareholders.”247 This need to signal company value has influenced strategic
242

See, e.g., Lev, supra note 2, at 132; van Ark, supra note 26, at 17 (noting that successful ICT
implementation is facilitated by investments in organizational capital); Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra
note 180, at 23 (commenting that investment in information technology often complements
organizational changes in companies, including changes in business processes and work
practices).
243
See Lev, supra note 6 (noting the lack of requirement for meaning disclosure from companies
about intangibles).
244
See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002);
Goldfinger, supra note 44, at 210-211 (speaking of coopetition, the coexistence of competition
and cooperation, that is often characteristic under the intangibles paradigm); BRONWYN H. HALL,
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION AND POLICY 11 (Inst. Bus. & Econ. Res., Dept. of
Econ., U. Cal. Berkeley, Paper No. E03-331, 2003) (noting that the patent system tends to
influence industrial organization), at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E03-331.
245
Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625. 627 (2002) (framing patents as a way of
credibly publicizing information); R. Polk Wagner & Gideon Parchamovsky, Patent Portfolios,
154 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing a portfolio theory of patenting), available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/research/details.cfm?search=1&detail=1&research_id=1545
#.
246
See infra notes 265 to 298 and accompanying text.
247
David S. Gelb & Philip Siegel, Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling, 15 REV.
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCOUNTING 307, 321 (2000).
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behaviors reflected in how companies talk about and use intangibles.248 Through
skillful use of intangibles paradigm discourse, some companies have been able to
effectively position themselves under the intangibles paradigm and achieve
significant increases in market valuations as a consequence.249
b.

Intangibles Paradigm Discourse and Practice at Enron

Enron’s accounting for its Blockbuster venture demonstrates its use of intangibles
paradigm discourse.250 In July 2000, Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay announced
the formation of a 20-year deal involving a venture with Blockbuster Inc. that
would allow consumers to have movies sent via telephone lines to watch on
televisions at home. The partnership was announced with great fanfare and
described as the “ultimate bricks-clicks-and-flicks strategy.”251 Without
Blockbuster’s knowledge, within months of making the deal with Blockbuster,
Enron had set up the Braveheart affiliated partnership and obtained a $115.2
million investment in the Braveheart partnership from CIBC World Markets in
exchange for CIBC’s receiving a promise of future earnings from Enron’s share
of the Blockbuster partnership for 10 years.252 Within eight months of this
announcement, the partners had split, with Enron blaming Blockbuster for not
getting big movie studios to sign licensing deals for the most popular titles.253
Even though the Braveheart partnership had no separate staff or operations other
than Enron’s stake in the Blockbuster venture, “Enron claimed $110.9 million in
profits from Braveheart in the fourth quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of
2001.”254 Braveheart was never more than a pilot project and never had any
significant number of paying customers.255 When Enron formed Braveheart in
December 2000, it “assigned the partnership a value of $124.8 million based on
its projections of the revenue and earnings potential of the Blockbuster
venture.”256 Although Enron’s behavior was at best a serious misrepresentation,
Enron’s actions do reveal something about the nature and flexibility that

248

Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29.
Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29.
250
See Rebecca Smith, Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron Overplayed its
Hand, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2002); see also McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 291-295
(describing the Braveheart transaction in detail).
251
See Smith, supra note 250.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
249
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companies may have in manipulating even illusory intangibles that is not as
readily available to them for tangible assets.
In contrast to a tangible asset business model, which might involve setting up
physical retail locations, the proposed Blockbuster venture was an ICT focused
business endeavor that included a significant service component. As such, it
illustrates the types of business transactions that have become typical under the
intangibles paradigm. This combination of an ICT intensive business transaction
with a significant service component means, however, that far less about this
transaction would be required to be disclosed from an accounting perspective than
would typically be the case in a business transaction that involved physical retail
locations. This differential treatment makes verification of underlying economic
reality often more difficult in the context of intangibles paradigm business
practices. The types of unverifiable intangibles evident in the Enron Blockbuster
case make financial statements difficult to audit.257 They also make it much more
difficult for investors to rely upon financial statement numbers as true measures
of the economic value of an enterprise.
Enron exemplifies how skillful use of a particular discourse combined with
complexity in financial structure and presentation magnified the accounting haze
and obscured the company’s activities in a way that facilitated fraud.258 Enron’s
misrepresentations occurred in a broader environment in which many who should
have examined Enron’s accounting and business practices with greater care,
including analysts and financial reporters, were to a large extent captive to the
impressions that Enron sought to project.259 Enron was thus quite effective in
representing itself as a new economy company despite the fact that the reality of
its business practices did not support this representation.260

257

See Joshua Rosen, Editorial: Policy Reforms in the Aftermath of Accounting Scandals, 21 J.
ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 281, 284 (2002).
258
In addition to creating extremely complex financial structures, Enron also used derivates
extensively. This combination made deciphering Enron’s financial statements quite challenging
for even the most financially sophisticated readers. See infra notes 360 to 369 and accompanying
text.
259
See Scott Sherman, Enron-Gimme an ‘E’!: Uncovering the Uncovered Story,” COLUMBIA
JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 2002) at ___ available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2002/2/enronsherman.asp (noting that analysts and newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, Forbes,
Fortune and Worth rushed to embrace Enron in the late 1990s in “a universe where applause
obliterated skepticism”).
260
Id. at ___ (noting that reporters and analysts “who plunged into Enron’s finances became
instantly suspicious about what they found”).
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Enron was not alone in its use of aggressive accounting practices, although it was
atypical in the scope and dimension of the fraud and misrepresentation involved
in its accounting and representations. 261 During the late 1990s, many companies
used aggressive accounting practices, which resulted in an unprecedented number
of financial restatements. 262 Financial restatements occur when companies
acknowledge that prior financial statements were inaccurate and release financial
statements reflecting the correct numbers.263
The shift to an intangibles paradigm in both its metaphysical or worldview and
sociological or operational aspects is a particularly important one from which to
consider the operation of systems of rules that regulate business behavior. This
fundamental paradigm shift is an important context in which many current ICT
era regulatory debates should be placed. Understanding the core aspects of this
paradigm shift requires looking at the operation of existing categories and rules
under the intangibles paradigm.

261

See Lawrence Revsine, Enron: Sad but Inevitable, 21 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138
(2002) (characterizing Enron debacle as an extreme example of selective financial
misrepresentation that is inevitable in the current financial reporting environment); George J.
Bentson & Al L. Hartgraves, Enron: What Happened and What We Can Learn From It, 21 J.
ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 105 (2002) (outlining Enron’s complex financial structures and
transactions and looking at their affects on Enron’s financial statements).
262
See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 282-285 (2004) (noting increase in earnings restatements of more
than 250% in the five years ending in 2002); GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4; see also infra
notes 334 to 345 and accompanying text.
263
GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 2 (discussing and analyzing financial restatements, which are
defined as entailing corrections of accounting irregularities that result in material misstatements of
financial results).
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THE INTANGIBLES “HAZE”: MEASURING AND DESCRIBING INTANGIBLES
The existing reporting model is not well suited to identifying and reporting
on key value and risk elements inherent in our twenty-first century
knowledge-based economy. . .despite the continuing efforts of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and SEC to enhance financial
reporting, changes in the business environment—such as the growth in
information technology, new types of relationships between companies, and
the increasing use of complex business transactions and financial
instruments—constantly threaten the relevance of financial statements and
pose a formidable challenge for standard setters.264

A.

Capital Asset or Current Expense?: Differential Accounting Treatment of
Intangibles

The intangibles haze refers to the fact that current accounting treatment of
intangibles often results in financial statements that are unclear and not reflective
of underlying economic reality. Accounting systems present companies with a set
of guidelines or rules that are then used to present and explain the company’s
financial status and transactions for both internal and external purposes.265
Depending on the nature of the transaction, a company may have an ability to
frame or engage in self-presentation and have potentially varying degrees of
flexibility in how it accounts for the transaction.266 In addition, tax accounting for
the same transaction might be entirely different.267 The fundamental assumption
of the current accounting system is that assets are often valued at historical
cost.268
Debates over the accounting treatment of intangibles are certainly not new and
date back some 100 years.269 The appropriate accounting treatment for
intangibles remains a hotly debated topic in FASB, the academic accounting
264

Id. at 57.
See supra notes 124 to 136 and accompanying text.
266
Mundstock, supra note 30, at 839 (noting that flexibility of accounting standards means that
accounts need only be acceptable, not correct, which serves the interests of accountants and
corporate managers but is contrary to the needs of investors).
267
See, e.g., Luppino, supra note 100, at 35 (discussing synthetic lease transaction in which the
corporation is a tenant for financial statement accounting or book purposes, but an owner for tax
purposes, which enables companies to avoid putting debt on their balance sheets for financial
statement purposes); see also supra notes 100 to 111 and accompanying text.
268
See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 813.
269
Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 19; Smith & Parr, supra note 40, at 89 (noting that
accountants have long grappled with how to treat intangibles in financial statements).
265
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literature and the popular press.270 The focus of this debate has centered around
whether intangibles should be treated as an operating expense reflected on a
company’s income statement or a capital expense recorded on a company’s
balance sheet.271
Current U.S. accounting rules result in a mix of market and book (historical)
values.272 Accounting treatment of company expenses exemplifies this mixture.
A company’s expenses may be characterized as operating, financing or capital
expenses.273 Operating expenses are expenses that relate to the current period such
as labor costs and are subtracted from revenues during such period to determine a
company’s operating earnings.274 Financing expenses would include expenses
associated with nonequity financings such as debt and would include interest
expense, for example.275 Financing expenses are deducted from operating
earnings to estimate net income.276 Capital expenses create assets, characterized
as assets because they are expected to generate benefits over multiple periods.277
Such assets are placed on the balance sheet.278 The value of such capital assets is
then and written off or deducted on a company’s income statement over their
estimated useful life through depreciation (physical assets) or amortization
(intangibles).279 The remaining net value of such capital assets remains on a
company’s balance sheet as the capital asset is depreciated or amortized. A
distinction exists generally between treatment of expenses relating to investments
in intangibles as opposed to tangible items, with intangible expenses being largely
operating expenses while tangible expenses are to a far greater extent treated as
capital expenses.280 As a result, in the case of intangibles, even expenses that are

270

See Chandra Kanodia, Haresh Sapra & Raghu Venugopalan, Should Intangibles Be Measured:
What are the Economic Trade-Offs?, 42 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 89, 90 (2004).
271
Id.
272
See Wallman, supra note 301; Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 33-35.
273
See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 1.
274
Id. at 1-2.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 2.
277
Hawkins, supra note 12, at 50 (noting that assets represent “probable future, measurable
economic benefits which the reporting entity has acquired through a current or past transaction.”);
Carney, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that assets are things owned by a business that only include
“probable future economic benefits owned or controlled by the business, that are obtained in a
“transaction” to which accountants can attach a price.”).
278
Carney, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that a balance sheet “reflects the firm’s ownership of
assets, and the claims against them, on a stated date.”).
279
Id. at 1-2, 4.
280
Lev, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that tangible resources are considered assets while the
intangibles are typically expensed).
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expected to generate benefits over multiple periods are often treated as operating
expenses rather than capital expenses.281
In the realm of accounting treatment of intangibles, however, a further distinction
exists between treatment of internally generated intangibles and purchased
intangibles.282 Purchased intangibles such as those acquired from a target
company in a merger or acquisition, for example, are capitalized and placed on a
company’s balance sheet.283 In contrast, most internally generated intangibles are
expensed and appear on a company’s income statement as operating expenses.284
Examples of internally generated intangibles would include knowledge generated
from a company’s research and development, for example, which for many ICT
oriented and biotechnology companies represents the vast majority of the
company’s value. Such internally generated intangible expenses are typically
expensed, which means that they are essentially treated in the same manner as
overhead expenses such as salary, for example, and reported as an expense on the
company’s income statement typically during the year in which the expenditure
occurs. The company’s net income or profit during the year in which this
deduction occurs would then be reduced to reflect this expenditure. Yet other
internally generated intangibles are not separately identified in financial
statements at all, but are also treated as operating expenses.285 The differential
treatment of purchased and internally generated intangibles would mean that the
same intangible resource might receive different accounting treatment depending
on whether a company purchased it or developed it internally.
U.S. accounting rules do not generally permit companies to capitalize intangibles
and place them on the company’s balance sheet unless the intangibles are
purchased intangibles.286 As a result, GAAP would require that a company
281

See infra note 286 and accompanying text; Hawkins, supra note 12, at 591 (noting that due
conservatism in application of accounting principles, intangible asset costs are typically written off
as incurred, or if capitalized, amortized over a relatively short time period).
282
See Kanodia et al., supra note 270, at 90.
283
See FASB, Statement of Accounting Standards No. 141, Business Combinations ¶¶ 47-51
(June 2001) (hereinafter, “FASB 141”) (discussing appropriate accounting treatment for intangible
assets in a merger or acquisition context).
284
Kanodia et al., supra note 270, at 90.
285
Id. at ___.
286
For an overview of the rules and principles relevant to the accounting treatment of intangible
assets, see FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142, Goodwill and Other
Intangible Assets ¶¶ 9-10 (June 2001) (hereinafter, “FASB 142”) (discussing accounting
treatment of goodwill and intangibles generally); FASB 141, supra note 283; FASB, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs ¶12 (Oct.
1974) (requiring expensing of most research and development costs); see also Shyam
Vallabhajosyula, Appendix A: Accounting Rules and Regulations for Intangibles, in INTANGIBLES

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy

59

capitalize purchases of computer hardware and certain types of software
developed internally, but would have the company expense the other costs such as
computer installation, business process development and investments in
associated intangibles.287 Even when GAAP permits capitalization of
intangibles,288 companies do not for the most part capitalize intangibles unless the
intangibles are being acquired in a merger or acquisition context.289 Since
intangibles are in most cases not capitalized, the assets that are capitalized and
that end up on a company’s balance sheet are typically primarily the company’s
tangible assets, such as the computer hardware in the example discussed above.290
This differential treatment of tangible assets and intangibles is significant for
several reasons. It tends to result in distortions of reported financial statements
because such financial statements do not accurately reflect the true economic
value of many business enterprises. This is one reason a gap may arise between
the market value of a company and the book value of the company’s assets as
reported on a company’s balance sheet.291 Measures of a company’s performance
will then also be distorted,292 which may influence on measures of corporate
performance such as earnings per share, return on assets and return on income.293
135-154 (Baruch Lev, 2001) (discussing Accounting Practices Board Opinion No. 17, Intangible
Assets, which FASB 142 superseded, but which contained an essentially similar requirement with
respect to expensing of internally developed intangibles) (hereinafter, “Vallabhajosyula”);
Hawkins, supra note 12, at 591 (noting that acquired intangibles are capitalized and amortized
over two or more periods, while internally developed intangibles are typically expensed as
incurred, rather than capitalized). The U.S. treatment of intangibles may be contrasted with the
European standard evident in IAS No. 38, which has a different standard for the capitalization of
intangibles, and which permits recognition of internally generated intangibles in certain limited
circumstances. See IAS 38, supra note 41.
287
Sinkyu Yang & Erik Brynjolfsson, Intangible Assets and Growth Accounting: Evidence from
Computer Investments 3 (2000), at
http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/136%20erikb,%20Intangible%20assets.pdf.
288
Under FASB rules, companies are required to but rarely capitalize certain software
development costs. See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 86, Accounting
for the Costs of Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed (Aug. 1985); see
also Vallabhajosyula, supra note 286, at 137-138.
289
In a merger or acquisition context, the difference between the amount the acquiring company
pays for the acquired company and the book value of the acquired company’s assets would be
recorded on the acquiring company’s balance sheet as goodwill. See FASB 141, supra note 286.
290
See Lev, supra note 18, at 79-103.
291
See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see supra notes 165 to 188 and accompanying text.
292
Such measures of performance would include the return on equity, return on assets and net
income. See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see also infra notes 293 to 295 and accompanying text.
293
See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 830 (“All costs of internal R&D are to be treated as a current
expense rather than treated as an investment, like buying an asset. For this reason, as discussed
above, a high-tech company shows few assets and can look like it is losing money even if it is
doing quite well.”).
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The degree and direction of these inaccuracies will depend on the type of
company and nature of the company’s business.294 Current accounting treatment
of intangibles results, for example, in the characterization of research and
development expenditures as operating expenses, which generally lowers
operating income and net income.295 In firms where research and development
expenses have increased rapidly over time, treating expenses associated with
intangibles in a similar fashion to tangible expenditures would result in
reclassification of operating expenses as capital expenses, which would decrease
operating expenses, thus increasing operating income and likely causing return on
capital to increase.296 In contrast, in mature firms with stable research and
development expenses, the return on capital may decrease with the
reclassification of research and development expenses.297
The influence of accounting treatment on measures of company performance is
often particularly significant for companies in the ICT sector because their
relative expenditures on intangibles are often higher. As a result of differential
treatment of tangible and intangibles resources, true role of intangibles in for
businesses today far too often remains ill-defined and hazy and, even more
importantly, not transparent.298
B.

Accounting Systems and Information: Disclosure and Decision Making
Under the Intangibles Paradigm

A major purpose of financial accounting systems is provision of information that
can be used to make decisions.299 These systems, for example, constitute major
sources of information for investors,300 as well as for internal decision making
purposes. Investors may look at company ratios and performance measures such
as return on assets, return on equity or earnings measures, to make a
determination as to whether to undertake or maintain an existing investment in a
particular company.

294

See Lev, supra note 169, at 18.
Damodaran, supra note 168, at 4, 21.
296
Id. at 23.
297
Id. at 23.
298
See Lev, supra note 18, at 37-42, 89-90.
299
Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 4; see also Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 175-177
(noting that in contrast to nineteenth and early twentieth century, when accounting innovations
were initiated by industrialists and practitioners, writing in management accounting since 1920 has
been dominated by academics emphasizing simple decision-making models in highly simplified
forms).
300
Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 4.
295
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The rise of intangibles has highlighted potential deficiencies in existing
accounting rules as is evident in the fact that United States GAAP has essentially
not fully confronted the reality of this new paradigm.301 This failure to come to
terms has been a factor in recent prominent corporate scandals.302 A common
backdrop to these scandals was a business environment where companies were
able to commit fraud by taking advantage of the fact that existing accounting and
disclosure rules do not adequately reflect the reality of business practices today,
particularly with regard to the roles now played by intangibles in such practices.
The ability of such companies to promote inaccurate representations of economic
reality and inflate financial results is in no small part due to gaps in current
accounting treatment of and disclosure requirements with respect to intangibles.303
The systematic distortions in accounting measures and disclosure that are
characteristic under the intangibles paradigm can influence investment and
managerial decisions.304 For example, the fact that accounting systems do not
adequately measure the economic reality and the role played by intangibles is a
critical factor in the market to book gap. In the absence of other adequate
explanations, market participants may tend to perceive this gap as reflective of the
value of intangibles, which may or may not be an accurate assessment of
underlying economic reality. Distorted accounting combined with accounting
fixation mean that persons looking at and making decisions on the basis of
distorted financial statements, even those with an understanding of accounting,
may not see through the skewed numbers to the underlying economic reality.305
This is problematic because it leaves more room for companies themselves to use
framing and presentation to present alternate representations of reality that are not
contradicted by measures that can be made using existing reporting and disclosure
requirements. This gives companies far more leeway that might exist with respect
to tangibles paradigm business practices to fill this gap and influence how this gap

301

See Wallman, supra note 63.
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (discussing corporate scandals at
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Qwest).
303
See infra notes 349 to 383 for a discussion of Enron.
304
Baruch Lev, Bharat Sarath & Theodore Sougiannis, R&D Reporting Biases And Their
Consequences 4 (Dec. 1999), at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/knowledge&shareholdervalue.doc.
305
See Joan L. Luft & Michael D. Shields, Why Does Fixation Persist, in INTANGIBLE ASSETS
415-446 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003) (discussing influence of learning on
individuals’ judgments about effects of intangibles).
302
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might be perceived.306 Financial statements actually rooted in and more accurately
representative of the underlying economic reality of the company are critical to
the operation of regulatory structures that govern company behavior under the
intangibles paradigm.
The inherent distortions in current accounting measures of intangibles are
magnified by generally inadequate disclosure by businesses about intangibles.307
Companies may disclose little publicly or specifically, for example, about
research and development or other innovative activities or the revenues or
expenses generated by such activities.308 Moreover, when more detailed
information is revealed, it often occurs in contexts such as business magazines, in
which companies have significant ability to determine the positioning and nature
of disclosures made.309 The lack of detailed disclosure with respect to intangibles
means that it can be difficult to know how intangibles are actually implemented in
a particular business organization, which might be one window from which to
view and verify the specific operational and true economic contribution of
intangibles.310 The resulting accounting haze thus gives companies a significant
amount of latitude to choose how to frame and situate themselves within the
intangibles paradigm from the perspective of financial statements and other
disclosure documents.
Much like the FASB requirements with respect to treatment of and disclosure
about intangibles in company financial statements, SEC regulations governing
company preparation of financial statements require very limited disclosure about
intangibles.311 Although discussion of intangibles may be required by general
guidelines concerning preparation of financial statements, the most substantial
explicit reference to intangible assets appears in the balance sheet preparation
306

See Lev, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that a temptation exists for companies to change the
level of intangibles investment to manage reported earnings to meet and exceed the expectations
of analysts).
307
See Lev, supra note 6, at 112.
308
Id. (noting that no information is disclosed about investments in intangibles or revenue
generated by such investments, such as patent-licensing fees or shares of revenue coming from
new products).
309
Baruch Lev, Research and Development and Capital Markets, 11 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 21, 21
(1999).
310
Id. (noting that lack of disclosure leaves investors in the dark about how companies allocate
resources with respect to research and development budgets, product development, amounts
involved in other intangibles, including software development and acquisition, brand enhancement
and employee training).
311
See Shorter, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that Regulation S-X outlines the standards that
registered public companies and their accountants must follow in generating financial statements).
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requirements in SEC Regulation S-X, which requires the following disclosure
with respect to intangibles:
15.
Intangible assets. State separately each class of such assets which
is in excess of five percent of the total assets, along with the basis of
determining the respective amounts. Any significant addition or deletion
shall be explained in a note.312
Sarbanes-Oxley, adopted on July 30, 2002, significantly modified the corporate
governance, accounting and disclosure requirements for companies with publicly
traded securities.313 Although adopted largely in response to several corporate
scandals in which intangibles were a factor in corporate deception or fraud,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley do not
contain specific requirements with respect to intangibles or accounting more
generally.314 Sarbanes-Oxley may, however, have an impact on the quality of
corporate-level disclosure about intangibles as a consequence of the requirements
for criminal and civil certifications of financial statements and company
disclosures by Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers and civil
and criminal penalties if such certifications prove false. 315 At the same time,
however, disclosure with respect to intangibles is further complicated by the
uncertainty often inherent in intangibles, which may potentially expose companies
to securities law liability in the event that predictions about intangibles should
prove incorrect.316

312

See 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02. Other references to intangibles or intangible assets in Regulation SX are quite specialized, including references in relation to accumulated depreciation, excess cost
over intangible assets required and other assets that constitute greater than 30 percent of
stockholders’ equity, intangible drilling and development costs and intangible utility plants of
public utilities. Regulation S-K disclosure requirements with respect to narrative descriptions of a
business require the registered company to disclose “[t]he importance to the segment and the
duration and effect of all patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises and concessions held,” 17
C.F.R. § 229.101(1)(iv), as well as requirements with respect to required exhibits relating to
material contracts involving patents and other intangibles.
313
See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31; see also Michael A. Perino, Some Reflections on the
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671 (2002)
(assessing the deterrence value of Sarbanes Oxley).
314
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
315
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31, at §§ 302, 906. See also Presentation of Stacey Rabbino, Esq.,
Chief Intellectual Property Counsel of Verisign, Inc., IP Asset Management After Sarbanes-Oxley,
Slides 9, 22 (Sept. 9, 2003), at www.kilpatrickstockton.com/news/events/presentations/ 09-0903%20IP%20Mangement%20and%20Sarbox.ppt (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley requires that
intellectual assets must be reported).
316
Blair & Wallman, supra note 158.
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Verifiability and Transparency under the Intangibles Paradigm: The
Usefulness of Financial Statements

Differential accounting treatment and current disclosure requirements have a
significant effect on the transparency and verifiability of the economic reality of
intangible resources. Lack of information about and coherent standards with
respect to intangibles makes it more difficult to measure, independently evaluate
and verify the true role that intangibles play in a particular business
organization.317 From an information perspective, then, the actual basis
underlying any company-specific market to book gap may not be truly
ascertainable nor is it certain that accounting rules will adequately capture the true
sources of value for businesses operating under an intangibles paradigm. As a
result, companies may have greater ability to characterize and frame themselves
in such a way as to emphasize the importance of intangibles and manage earnings
accordingly, with the knowledge that the nature of the accounting system makes
such characterizations less transparent and more difficult to verify.318 Such
characterizations may be given more credence than they might otherwise have,
thus making intangibles more susceptible to manipulation than is the case with
tangible assets.
By emphasizing the importance of intangibles from a business and operational
perspective, a firm can also attempt to maximize the influence of such assets on
overall firm market value, regardless of whether this emphasis reflects economic
reality.319 One study of firms with high advertising and research and development
expenditures found that because such firms are more likely to view mandatory
GAAP disclosures as inadequate, they are more likely to focus on alternative

317

Van Ark, supra note 26, at 13 (“Despite its recognized importance, the problems concerning
the conceptualization of intangible capital, its measurement and integration into a production
function or growth accounting framework are still huge and largely unresolved.”). The market
appears to be able to value research and development investments and market valuations of
research and development positively related to estimates of firm value. See Baruch Lev & Paul
Zarowin, The Market Valuation of R&D Expenditures 29, (Dec. 1998), at
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/research.html.
318
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1052 (“Financial statements and footnotes are very summary
documents. Decision making about treatments goes on in a black box, evolving as a matter of
practice amongst insiders. There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting the law-tofact application. This diminishes the chance for outside evaluation”) (citations omitted).
319
Id. at 1039 (“Readers of financial reports are not on notice to bring skepticism to bear, at least
until very recently. Even if they proceed cautiously, they get only indirect means, within the
reports’ four corners, with which to sort number influenced by advocacy from harder numbers
uninfluenced by management’s agenda.”).
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disclosures to signal company value, including financial signals such as share
repurchases and dividends.320
Signaling behaviors with respect to intangibles and intellectual property are
another way in which companies signal markets concerning an aggressive value
maximizing approach to development and enforcement of rights with respect to
intangibles, including intellectual property rights.321 Such behaviors have been
used by The SCO Group, for example, in its assertions of rights emanating from
copyright claims with respect to Linux code.322 Such assertions of legal rights in
this context were initially associated with an increase in stock price of more than
700 percent.323
One significant consequence of the intangibles haze has been the decline in the
usefulness of financial statements for investors, on account of their failure to
accurately reflect economic value and underlying economic reality.324 This has
implications for regulatory regimes governing business and consequently may
undercut such financial regulatory measures. One aspect of the greater risk and
uncertainty of intangibles from an accounting perspective relates to the fact that
companies often lack full control over intangibles.325 Intangibles are also often

320

See Gelb & Siegel, supra note, 247, at 309-310.
See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 (discussing series of five lawsuits involving
IBM, Novell, RedHat, Daimler-Chrysler and Autozone, connected to SCO’s assertions of rights).
322
Id. (noting that SCO does not in fact own Unix copyrights)
323
Id.
324
Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 30 (“Failure to correctly reflect the impact of intangibles on
the current and future performance of the business implies that accounting statements fail to
present an unbiased (true and fair) view of the firm’s financial position. Therefore, investors are
provided with non-relevant and non-comparable financial statements and will most likely not be
able to assess the value of companies to make efficient resource allocation decisions.”); Amir &
Lev, supra note 163 (suggesting that financial information alone is irrelevant for valuation of
cellular companies because of accounting measurement and reporting system cannot provide
value-relevant information because of high level of intangibles in wireless industry, although
financial information combined with nonfinancial information does help explain market prices);
Francis & Schipper, supra note 163 (noting that the explanatory power of earnings levels has
significantly declined over time); Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112 (giving overview of why
accounting measures no longer provide relevant or appropriate measures of business operations);
Lev & Zarowin, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that usefulness of financial information has declined
over the last 20 years); but c.f. Brett Trueman, M.H. Franco Wong & Xiao Jun Zhao, The Eyeballs
Have It: Searching for the Value in Internet Stocks, 38 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 137 (2000) (noting
that although Internet company stock values are not associated with net income, but rather a
relationship between exists between gross profit and stock market prices, suggesting that investors
may just value such companies differently).
325
Lev, supra note 18, at 83.
321
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difficult to measure, quantify and value.326 For this reason, the verifiability of
intangible assets is an important question, and verifiability problems exist with
respect to intangibles as compared to tangible resources.327 Verifiability thus
provides an important behavioral check in the world of tangible assets that is far
too often not available to the same extent for intangibles. GAAP has been
characterized as a blend of uninformative and largely verifiable descriptions of
past transactions and informative and largely unverifiable projections of future
income.328 Intangibles typically fall into the latter category.329
The ways in which accounting rules have been applied in the intangibles
paradigm context has tended to create a haze of uncertainty, with few standards
for reliable disclosure concerning intangibles.330 This vacuum has been filled at
least to some extent by business framing and discourse controlled by companies
that seek to position themselves within the intangibles paradigm in an attempt to
maximize firm market value. 331 This background is instructive in considering
examples involving the use of intangibles in specific business contexts under the
intangibles paradigm.
IV.

INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTANGIBLES HAZE

The internal generation of many intangibles may pose concerns for transparency
and verifiability. Even if the expenditures for an intangible can be accurately
measured, questions may continue to exist concerning the verifiability of the asset
or resource. One reason historically that accounting systems did not capitalize
intangibles was as a result of fear of uncertainty.332 In addition, accountants do
326

Gelb & Siegel, supra note, 247.
This lesser degree of verifiability is rooted in the risks, uncertainty and lack of transparency
that is typical of intangibles today. See Lev, supra note 18, at 37-42, 89-90 (noting risks,
uncertainty and lack of transparency that is typical of intangibles).
328
See Rosen, supra note 257, at 84.
329
See Lev, supra note 18, at 81 (“practically every material item on the balance sheet and income
statement, with the exception of cash, is based on subjective estimates about future events”).
330
Several countries and companies have, however, implemented schemas or strategies for dealing
with intangibles. See, e.g., P.N. Bukh, H.T. Larsen & J. Mouritsen, Constructing Intellectual
Capital Statements, 17 SCAND. J. MGMT 87 (2001) (analyzing development of intellectual capital
statements at 19 Danish firms); Danish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Intellectual Capital
Statements – The New Guidelines (Feb. 2003) (setting forth guidelines for preparing intellectual
capital statements), at http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/cgi-bin/themelist.cgi?theme_id=100650&_lang=uk.
331
See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying text for discussion regarding Enron.
332
See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 3 (noting that the rationale for expensing R&D is the belief
that benefits are uncertain and may occur only when research leads to a commercial product).
327
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not always have the expertise that might be needed to appropriately address the
role of intangibles in business organizations.333 As a result, a broad range of
potential issues that arise under the intangibles paradigm.
A.

The Intangibles Paradigm and Management of Earnings
1. The Intangibles Paradigm and Aggressive Accounting Practices

Because existing regulatory frameworks do not fully take account of the
intangibles paradigm, the advent of this paradigm has enabled certain companies
to obfuscate their financial reporting and increased their capacity to engage in
fraud.334 This was particularly evident in the late 1990s during the height of the
market bubble when a significant number of companies engaged in “creative”
accounting practices.335 Such creative accounting practices and the manifest
fraud at companies such as Enron, were facilitated by the application or
misapplication of existing financial reporting and securities disclosure
requirements.336 These practices thus reflect how current rules and regulatory
structures can be manipulated in the context of intangibles paradigm business
practices. This ability to manipulate such structures is in large part due to the fact
that such structures do not adequately contemplate the intangibles paradigm:

333

See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 831 (noting that one reason SFAS 2 requires that all
intangibles be expensed is that accountants lack the expertise to evaluate key intangible assets and
want to protect their turf).
334
In this respect, the intangibles paradigm presents opportunities for financial engineering that
may be distinguishable from accounting manipulation. See Dharan, supra note 91, at 111 (noting
that lack of disclosure transparency is one consequence of financial engineering, which may be
distinguished from accounting manipulation).
335
See Coffee, supra note 262, at 282-285 (noting that most common cause of restatements was
efforts of management to prematurely recognize income); Lorraine Magrath & Leonard G. Weld,
Abusive Earnings Management and Early Warning Signs, CPA J. ONLINE (Aug. 2004) (discussing
earnings management practices), at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0802/features/f085002.htm.
336
See Bratton, supra note 32, at 1055 (“GAAP’s present rules, applied in good faith, were more
than adequate to pick up the material misstatements in Enron’s financials.”).

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy

68

Another fundamental problem underlying the recent spate of accounting
shockers is the fact that GAAP is increasingly out of sync with today’s
business realities. The accounting rules were developed in an industrial
economy, but this is the information age. How do you precisely measure the
value of R&D, customer lists, brand names, patents and other intellectual
property? Of course, this situation creates opportunities for creativity, like
the ballooning practice of in-process R&D writeoffs. Former SEC
Commissioner Steve Wallman says “GAAP is not broke but is getting
increasingly rusty.” Others are less charitable. Superlawyer Bill Lerach, the
king of securities class action suits, suggests renaming GAAP “Cleverly
Rigged Accounting Ploys,’ or CRAP.”337
The intangibles paradigm has unfolded in a corporate context in which earnings
management is a widespread practice.338 Once abusive earnings management
practices begin, managers will typically spend time devising methods to ensure
that such practices continue.339 Abusive earnings management practices and
manipulation of GAAP can also be difficult for outsiders to detect.340 Because
intangibles paradigm financial statements often do not accurately represent
economic reality, may lack transparency and are often far more difficult to verify,
the intangibles paradigm represents an additional opportunity for companies to
manage earnings, manipulate GAAP and in some cases commit fraud.341 This is
likely one factor in the marked increase in earnings restatements in the five years
ending in 2002.342
337

Dowd, supra note 10, at 4.
See Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game (Sept. 1999), Speech at NYU Center for Law and
Business, New York, NY (noting that earnings management is a widespread but little-challenged
custom and includes practices such as “big bath” restructuring charges, creative acquisition
accounting, cookie jar reserves, immaterial misapplications of accounting principles and the
premature recognition of revenue), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
339
Magrath & Weld, supra note 335.
340
Id.
341
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1023 (“The stock market awakened in 2002 to discover that it no
longer had numbers it could trust. Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value
enhancement by the corporate culture of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even fraudulent
treatments to enhance reported earnings, and their auditors had been doing nothing to stop them.
So long as the money kept falling out of the sky during the bull market, nobody worried about the
diminishing independence of auditors. But what was ignored before 2001 triggered a crisis in
2002 in markets already reeling on economic fundamentals. As the audit failures piled up on one
another, investors lost confidence in managers, market intermediaries and auditors alike.”)
(citations omitted).
342
Coffee, supra note 262, at 282-285 (noting increase in earnings restatements of more than
250% in the five years ending in 2002).
338
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One underlying reason for such restatements was aggressive accounting practices,
particularly in the technology sector.343 Although such aggressive and creative
accounting practices were by no means new, the intangibles paradigm has made it
easier for companies to obscure economic reality through varied methods of
representation, including through use of financial statements, required disclosure
and intangibles paradigm discourse.344 Consequently, the intersection of
aggressive accounting practices and the intangibles paradigm provided companies
with new ways through which financial statements might be creatively adjusted
and manipulated to both manage earnings and commit fraud.
In addition to presenting new opportunities for doing business, the intangibles
paradigm thus presents new opportunities for committing fraud. A recent study
by the Financial Executives Research Foundation Inc. (FEI) suggests that
intangibles intensive companies were consistently found among the top ten in
terms of market losses resulting from financial restatements in 1998 to 2000.345 In
2000, five of the top 10 financial restatements involved either technology
companies or accounting issues relating to intangibles (Microstrategy, Lucent
Legato, Alphapharma and Avon Products).346 The same was true in 1999 (Yahoo,
Texas Instruments, BMC Software, Lycos and Xilinx); in 1998, four of the top 10
financial restatements involved either technology companies or accounting issues
relating to intangibles (Boston Scientific, Envoy Corp. SmarTalk and Telxon).347
A number of the restatements described in the FEI study, including Yahoo, BMC
343

See Edward Iwata, More Firms Falsify Revenue To Boost Stocks, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2000)
(noting widespread “revenue recognition problem” involving falsifying revenue and using
aggressive accounting practices that was most widespread in the technology sector); Matt Krantz,
CDNow Gains in Question, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 1999) (discussing 200% increase in sales for
ecommerce company CDNow that violated accounting norms by adding value of coupons
redeemed by customers to revenue); Susan Hwang & Judith Burns, Amazon Says SEC Ends
Inquiry on Stock Payments by Web Firms, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2002) (discussing end of SEC
inquiry into Amazon’s accounting treatment of stock payments to the company by Internet
companies, which Amazon booked as revenue, with no enforcement proceeding recommended);
Dowd, supra note 80 (noting pernicious and pervasive, but mostly legal, manipulation of
corporate financial statements to meet or beat analysts’ earning expectations).
344
See Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, Fuzzy Accounting Raises Flags, USA TODAY (June 22, 2001)
(noting pressure for financial performance as important factor in manipulation of financial
numbers); David Wessel, Why Boardroom Bad Guys Have Now Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J.
(June 20, 2002) (noting that the scope and scale of corporate fraud in the late 1990s was surpassed
only by the years preceding the Great Depression).
345
See FEI, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting (June 2001) (reporting a
spike in restatements that began in 1998, noting that on average 49 restatements occurred in 1997,
as compared with 91, 150 and 156 in 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively), available at
http://www.fei.org/download/QualFinRep-6-13-2k1.ppt.
346
Id.
347
Id.
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Software and Lycos, related to accounting treatment of in-process research and
development expenses.348 Although far from conclusive, the FEI results suggest
that further exploration of the intersection between aggressive accounting
practices and the intangibles paradigm might be fruitful.
Enron represents one aspect of use of the intangibles paradigm that reflects a
difference in both degree and kind. Enron exemplifies the use of corporate
representations of economic reality that actually serve to obscure such reality.
Enron also demonstrates how intangibles paradigm discourse can be used in the
course of such representations to commit fraud and illustrates the dangers of
regulatory frameworks that have yet to adjust to the economic reality of new
business practices.
2. The Intangibles Paradigm and Fraud at Enron
Enron was once one of the largest companies in the world.349 For six consecutive
years from 1996 to 2001, Enron was named by Fortune Magazine as the nation’s
most innovative company.350 Fortune also ranked Enron in 2001 as one of its “10
Stocks to Last the Decade.”351 In August 2000, Enron’s stock reached an all time
high of $90.56 per share (a multiple of 70 times its then reported earnings).352 In
the one year period from January 2001 to January 2002, the market capitalization
of Enron decreased by $63 billion.353 In addition, its CEO Jeffrey Skilling
resigned,354 and Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. By the time of
348

Id.; see also Huron Consulting Group, supra note 62, at 12 (noting that in-process research and
development expenses financial statements relate to instances where companies value acquired inprocess research and development using methods inconsistent with those preferred by the SEC).
349
See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
9, 9 (2002) (noting that Enron was once the seventh largest corporation in America with revenues
over $100 billion).
350
See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002); Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G.
Dharan eds., 2004); see also Sherman, supra note 259, at ___.
351
See Van Niel, supra note 350, at 11.
352
See Alyson Tonge, Lesley Greer & Alan Lawton, The Enron Story: You Can Fool Some of the
People Some of the Time . . ., 12 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW 4, 5 (2003). Enron received
laudatory press coverage as well. See Erin Davies, Enron: The Power’s Back On, FORTUNE (Apr.
13, 1998); Brian O’Reilly, The Power Merchant, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2000). Since Enron’s
earnings reflected numbers largely manufactured by Enron, this multiple is quite inaccurate given
that Enron’s actual earnings were much lower than its reported earnings.
353
See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 394 (2004).
354
Bethany McLean, Enron’s Power Crisis, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2001).

Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06
Do Not Cite or Distribute
Copyright 2006

Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy

71

its bankruptcy filing, Enron’s stock price had fallen to $0.29 per share.355 The
Enron case, although unusual in its magnitude, to some extent reflect aspects of
business and accounting practices of the time. One casualty of such practices was
ultimately Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, for whom Enron was the
last of several accounting mishaps.356 The dramatic fall of Enron occurred during
a time period in a climate of aggressive accounting practices reflected in, among
other practices, intangibles paradigm framing and discourse by companies.357
A number of internal and external factors may have contributed to Enron’s
financial collapse and bankruptcy filing, including inadequate deterrence by
gatekeepers such as analysts, auditors, rating agencies and lawyers, changes in
compensation structure of businesses generally resulting in more emphasis on
equity compensation, a market bubble that muted investor responses to
overvalued companies, changes in corporate governance practices generally,
aggressive earnings management by Enron managers and Enron corporate
culture.358
355

Tonge et al., supra note 352, at 21.
See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 144-146; Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen,
CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi0209010315sep01,1,1705920.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, A Civil War
Splits Andersen, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi0209020071sep02,1,2033601.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Ties To
Enron Blinded Andersen, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2002), at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0209030210sep03,1,657342.story?coll=chibusinessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 4,
2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi0209040368sep04,1,7342030.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Greg Farrell, Andersen Papers
Lost in Sunbeam Case, U.S.A. TODAY (Jan. 30, 2002), at
http://cgi.usatoday.com/money/energy/2002-01-31-andersen-sunbeam.htm#more.
357
See supra notes 338 to 345 and accompanying text.
358
Id. at 308 (giving general evaluation of primary explanations for Enron and other financial
scandals of late 1990s); Macey, supra note 353 (discussing disclosure and efficient capital markets
considerations with respect to Enron collapse); Yaniv Grinstein, Complementary Perspectives on
“Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron,” 89 CORNELL L. REV. 503 (2004)
(discussing Macey efficient markets and disclosure discussion); William S. Lerach, Plundering
America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders—The Rise of the
New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 104-125 (2002) (discussing lessons
learned from Enron and WorldCom); Rhode & Patton, supra note 349 (discussing the role of
lawyers in Enron collapse); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98 (giving overview of the rise and fall
of Enron); Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE (Dec. 24, 2001) (discussing the
principal factors behind Enron’s fall); Ronald R. Simms, & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics
(Or: Culture Matters More Than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003) (discussing the role of
Enron corporate culture); Mark Jickling, The Enron Collapse: An Overview of Financial Issues
(Mar. 28, 2003), CRS Report for Congress RS21135 (giving overview of the accounting and other
factors underlying fall of Enron); Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of
356
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Although Enron’s collapse was caused by a number of factors, perceptions of
Enron as evident in its market valuation and Fortune accolades were likely tied to
Enron’s sophisticated representations of economic reality through framing. This
framing served to establish the particular framework within which Enron
communicated information about the company to various audiences. Such
framing also made liberal use of intangibles paradigm discourse combined with
impenetrable financial statement presentations and extensive financial
manipulation and fraud.359 Enron’s operation within the intangibles paradigm at
the level of discourse, at least, was a key factor in its ability to transform its image
from that a pipeline company into a new economy exemplary.
In the 10 years following its formation in 1985, Enron transformed itself from an
owner of natural gas pipelines into a highly leveraged trading operation.360 A key
element of Enron’s ability to conduct its business during this time period was
connected to its receiving permission from the SEC to adopt mark-to-market
accounting methods for its energy contracts.361 Mark-to-market accounting
enabled Enron to become a trading and financial deal-making company.362 Enron
used mark-to-market accounting aggressively to recognize revenue for future
claims under contracts and other types of transactions.363 Valuation of such
claims, contracts and transactions was based on assumed fair values. These fair
values were often made based on quite questionable criteria and were also subject
to manipulation.364 Enron also typically only made positive adjustments and
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2003) (discussing the role of rating agencies at Enron); JULIA K.
BRAZELTON & JANICE L. AMMONS, EDS., ENRON & BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF
ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES (2002); McLean & Elkind,
supra note 98.
359
See infra notes 360 to 368.
360
Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 169 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (noting that at its core
Enron was a derivatives trading firm).
361
Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key
Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 104 (Nancy B.
Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 39-42; C. William
Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Apr. 2002) (noting Enron’s lack of
transparency in reporting its financial affairs), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2002/thomas.htm.
362
Dharan & Bufkins, supra note 361, at 104 (noting that mark-to-market accounting was the
genesis of Enron’s transformation into a trading and financial deal making firm); Partnoy, supra
note 360, at 169; Thomas, supra note 361 (noting unprecedented scale of Enron’s use of mark-tomarket accounting).
363
Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons form a Perfect Storm of Financial
Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Cultural Failures, 39 CAL. W.L. REV. 163 (2003).
364
Benston, supra note 52, at 1348 (noting that fair values are readily manipulated).
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frequently neglected to make even clearly necessary write-downs of assets.365
Enron also established SPEs intentionally structured to remove debt from Enron’s
balance sheet, 366 thus removing two-thirds of Enron’s debt from its balance
sheet.367 Enron in fact used derivatives and SPEs to manipulate its financial
statements in three ways, all of which entailed using mark-to-market accounting
to inflate Enron’s financial statements.368
Although Enron’s primary money making operations were those of a speculative
derivatives trading operation,369 Enron did not want to be valued like a trading
operation, which trade at lower valuations.370 Instead, Enron took advantage of
the increasingly prevalent intangibles paradigm discourse of the mid- and late
1990s in an attempt to position itself as a new economy company and thus receive
a new economy company valuation.371 It also launched business operations and
practices such as Enron Online and Enron Broadband to take advantage of
existing market conditions that gave higher valuations to new economy
companies. Enron Online, for example, was a trading system that Enron
developed for its energy trading business:

365

See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 128 (noting that Enron delayed recording losses by
refusing to write off dead deals).
366
Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate
Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002).
367
Macey, supra note 353, at 419.
368
Enron hid losses on technology stocks, concealed huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable
new businesses and inflated the value of other troubled assets. See Portnoy, supra note 362, at
171; see also THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 98.
369
See Portnoy, supra note 360, at 183.
370
See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 126 (noting that companies with primarily trading
businesses trade at low stock valuations); Enron at its peak traded at 70 times earnings, which is
significantly higher than the 20 times earnings that an established and well regarded investment
banking and trading firm, such as Goldman Sachs, trades. Tonge et al., supra note 352, at 5.
371
Although he is described as a Luddite, “Skilling touted broadband as the Next Big Thing for
Enron . . . If Skilling was going to get Enron an Internet-style valuation—and there was nothing he
wanted more—he’d have to convince Wall Street that Enron was becoming, at least in part, an
Internet company. He may not have known how to surf the Web, but the relationship between the
Internet and the stock market was something he understood all too well.” McLean & Elkind, supra
note 98, at 184-185.
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The story of the creation of Enron Online became an instant corporate
legend and a key part of the Enron myth, testimony to how Enron’s culture
fostered an entrepreneurial spirit that was at the root of the company’s
success . . . It also helped that EOL [Enron Online] was unveiled at the
height of the Internet mania, when any business conducted online had to be
a good thing, almost by definition. 372
Enron also described itself as a culture that “supported innovation” in common
with the then high flying dot-coms.373
Enron basically engaged in heavy intangibles paradigm discourse, which was
misleading and deceptive, because Enron did not invest in research and
development that would reflect or explain the magnitude of the intangibles it
claimed to have.374 Evidence that precipitated Enron’s downfall had in fact been
disclosed publicly by Enron.375 Potential gatekeepers that might have detected
Enron’s fraud appear to have been captivated by the impressions that Enron
sought to instill through intangibles paradigm discourse and framing.
Consequently, gatekeepers and others frequently accepted Enron’s assertions with
little critical scrutiny. When Enron unveiled its broadband strategy at its annual
analysts meeting on January 19 and 20, 2000, Enron’s performance included a
surprise guest, Scott McNealy, President of Sun Microsystems, who announced
Enron’s purchase of 18,000 Sun routers for its network.376 During the second day
of the meeting, Enron’s stock price had risen by 26 percent within the course of
the day.377 Time to reflect did not make analysts look more critically at their
assessments of Enron and the reactions can only be described as euphoric.378
Although some analysts did complain about how difficult Enron’s financial
statements were to read,379 it was not until well into 2001 that serious questions

372

Id. at 222.
Id. at 118, 121 (noting that “[m]uch of what Skilling was selling had the effect of positioning
Enron as a company that had more in common with the dot-coms than with an old energy giant
like Exxon”).
374
See Lev, supra note 2.
375
McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 407 (noting that “there was more than enough on the
public records to raise the hackles of any self-respecting analyst.”).
376
Id. at 243.
377
Id. at 244.
378
Id. (noting that Merrill Lynch’s analyst Donato Eassey stated “[a]lthough this is an energy
company, in our view, Enron fits the description of a ‘New Economy’ stock . . .”); O’Reilly, supra
note 352.
379
One analyst noted that Enron operated as a “giant hedge fund” without disclosing that risk in
SEC filings. Jennings, supra note 363, at 195.
373
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began to be raised about Enron’s financial status and the fact that no one really
understood how Enron’s business actually worked.380
In addition to benefiting from the hype associated with the Internet boom, the
management of Enron was also good at selling particular representations of Enron
that were directed toward an audience that was happy to receive Enron’s
representations with an exceedingly noncritical eye. Jeffrey Skilling, the COO for
a long period of time and more briefly the CEO, was in particular a “master
presenter.”381
Enron’s framing, both through presentations and actions, enabled it to maintain a
high stock price, at least for a while, which can itself alone serve an important
purpose for companies.382 In the end, however, even the best presentations were
not enough to sustain a company with chaotic operations sustained for years by
fraudulent accounting and reliance on manipulative intangibles paradigm
discourse rather than competent business practices.383
B.

Integrating ICTs: The Wal-Mart Distribution System

In contrast to Enron, Wal-Mart’s representations of economic reality and its
engagement with the intangibles paradigm appear to be more accurate depictions
of Wal-Mart’s actual business practices. Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer,384

380

Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced? FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2001) (characterizing Enron’s
business as a black box and noting that for all the lavish attention that Enron received, how Enron
actually made money remained impenetrable to outsiders); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at
318-323 (noting that questions were first asked about Enron in the fall of 2000 in Texas Journal, a
regional Wall Street Journal supplement, in an article the focused on mark to market accounting
and Fortune in the winter of 2001, leading short sellers to begin shorting Enron stock); Bethany
McLean, Ken, Lay Your Cards on the Table, FORTUNE (Nov. 12, 2001) (noting that questions
continue to exist about the true profitability of Enron’s core energy trading business); see also Bret
Farrell & Del Jones, How Did Enron Come Unplugged, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 2002); Jonathan D.
Glater, Enron’s Many Strands Accounting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2002).
381
McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 233.
382
See Daniel C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsiblity and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 972 (2002) (“As Enron
shows, a high stock price has an independent competitive purpose – it provides an acquisition
currency and a source of collateral that can be used to facilitate substantial (often hidden)
leveraging . . Also, and perhaps more subtly, stock price is a metric by which to test the success of
the control group currently in power in a firm with much hard-to-measure value, and hence goes
deeply to their sense of identity.”)
383
See generally McLean & Elkind, supra note 98.
384
See Stephen J. Arnold & John Fernie, Wal-Mart in Europe: Prospects for the UK, 17 INT’L
MARKETING REV. 416, 416 (2000) (noting number of Wal-Mart employees); WAL-MART 2004
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is the biggest company and employer in the United States,385 with some 1.3
million employees and fiscal year 2004 revenues of more than $256 billion.386
Although it is not in the ICT sector, Wal-Mart has been an early adopter of
technology in its business operations. Wal-Mart was one of the first retail
companies to introduce a comprehensive logistic system in its stores, spending
more than $1 billion on information technology. 387 This investment permitted
Wal-Mart to process orders directly from retail stores to suppliers based on actual
sales. This investment thus enabled Wal-Mart to replace inventory with a just in
time delivery system based on the information provided through its logistics
system.388
Wal-Mart has throughout its history made significant investments in technology
to minimize costs and facilitate management.389 Wal-Mart began installing a
satellite system that enabled stores to communicate with Wal-Mart headquarters
and computerized the company’s distribution system in 1976.390 By the early
1990s, this communication system had developed into Retail-Link, which
provides point of sale data on sales trends and inventories of the suppliers’
products on a store by store basis.391 Wal-Mart’s distribution and
communications systems are built in-house. 392 The Retail Link system cost WalMart an estimated $4 billion to develop.393
Companies such as Wal-Mart, Dell and Cisco have used technology to redefine
the nature of relationships with their suppliers. Both Dell and Wal-Mart have
focused on maintaining low inventories and streamlining distribution processes so
as to cut costs that can be passed on to customers.394 Wal-Mart’s computer
systems track a myriad of information and require that suppliers use the same
system. As a result, Wal-Mart has made technology a core competency.395
ANNUAL REPORT (2004), at 13 (stating that revenues were more than $256 billion for the fiscal
year ended January 31, 2004).
385
Cora Daniels, Women vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE (July 21, 2003)
386
Cora Daniels, Up Unions vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE (May 17, 2004).
387
Daum, supra note 65, at 14.
388
Id.
389
See Sandra S. Vance & Roy V. Scott, Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in
Modern Southern Entrepreneurship, 58 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 231, 242 (1992) (noting that Wal-Mart
invested in an IBM 370/135 computer system in the mid-1970s for inventory control, payroll and
other financial records and to obtain statistical data about store sales).
390
America’s Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE (Mar. 1, 1999).
391
Arnold & Fernie, supra note 384, at 422.
392
America’s Most Admired Companies, supra note 390.
393
Arnold & Fernie, supra note 384, at 422.
394
America’s Most Admired Companies, supra note 390.
395
Id.
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Despite the greater accuracy of Wal-Mart’s representations of economic reality
and fact that technology is a core feature of Wal-Mart’s business, specific
disclosure with respect to ICTs and intangibles is minimal in Wal-Mart financial
statements. The role of ICTs and intangibles is consequently not transparent and
is thus hard to verify. The estimated $4 billion Wal-Mart spent on its technology
and communications systems is not recorded on its balance sheet. Wal-Mart
income statements, which may contain expenses incurred during the time period
covered by the statement, do not break out these expenses separately or indicate
the magnitude of such expenses. As a result, public information about Wal-Mart
in magazine and academic articles at times provides more information about the
company’s principal intangibles than do Wal-Mart’s financials statements and
disclosures.
V.

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

The intangibles paradigm raises a host of issues with respect to existing regulatory
frameworks, including in relation to securities disclosure, accounting and
financial reporting, capital requirements and tax laws. The reforms precipitated
by Enron and other corporate scandals did not really touch upon the core of
operation of the intangibles paradigm that underlay many of the activities that
such reforms were intended to address. In addition, such reforms do not address
the distortions in the representation of economic reality evident in financial
statement reporting and other company disclosures that have been one
characteristic of the intangibles paradigm. Although reform of existing regulatory
structures is needed, such reform would also notably play an important role in
providing behavioral incentives by setting standards upon which private
enforcement of established standards is based.396 Such private enforcement is
quite important since the SEC, for example, is constrained by resources. Much
enforcement of GAAP is actually done by corporations and their Boards of
Directors.397
As then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted in 1998, “[t]he significance of
transparent, timely and reliable financial statements and its importance to investor
396

See Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S. Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty for
Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover (Aug. 2004), available
at 07.36.165.114/NewOrleans/Papers/1401148.pdf (noting importance of private penalties and
enforcement of GAAP rules); Denton Collins, Austin L. Reitenga & Juan Manuel SanchezCuevas, Managerial Consequences of Earnings Restatements (Oct. 2004), available at
business.utsa.edu/departments/ acc/arc/papers/CR_Draft.pdf (looking at penalties given to
managers connected to earnings restatements).
397
See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
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protection have never been more apparent.”398 Moving existing securities
disclosure and accounting frameworks fully into the knowledge economy will
help ensure that financial statements and company representations of economic
reality and disclosures with respect to intangibles provide information that is
transparent, reliable and relevant to company operations.
A.

The Intangibles Haze and Corporate Governance

The intangibles paradigm represents a potential challenge to corporate governance
structures because of the uncertainty and greater risk of intangibles.399 This is
particularly true for members of the Board of Directors, who may not be wellequipped or given adequate information to understand fully the implications of
business practices under the intangibles paradigm. Conducting due diligence with
intangibles may also often be different than is required in the case of physical
assets.
In addition, since so many intangibles are generated internally within companies,
understanding something of the nature of such intangibles requires that the
company itself have an accurate assessment of the contribution of such
intangibles to company operations. Such notions of value can be difficult to
penetrate and evaluate effectively. In addition, both internal and external
understandings have the potential to be skewed or distorted as a result of
intangibles paradigm practices and discourse. Since our current corporate law
system is largely based on self-regulation, the implications for the intangibles
haze for corporate governance are potentially quite profound.400
The potential negative consequences of intangibles paradigm business practices
for members of the Board of Directors has been underscored recently by recent
proposed settlements by board members at Enron and WorldCom that entailed
payments by such board members out of their personal assets.401 Not
398

Levitt, supra note 338.
Cf GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 55-56 (discussing the relationship between corporate governance and
accounting oversight).
400
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1024 (“In our self-regulatory system of corporate law, the job of
insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves in the first instance on the gatekeepers.”).
401
See Jonathan D. Glater, A Big New Worry for Corporate Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6. 2005
(discussing $18 million out of pocket settlement from personal assets by board members of
WorldCom to settle a securities class action suit); Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Directors Chip In on
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9. 2005 (noting that a group of 10 former directors of Enron “have
agreed to pay $13 million out of their own pockets as part of a $168 million settlement of a lawsuit
brought by onetime shareholders who lost billions of dollars in the company's collapse in 2001”);
Gretchen Morgenson, If Corporate Directors Snooze, Now They May Lose, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9.
2005, at 3 (noting that WorldCom directors agreed to pay one-fifth of their aggregate net worth in
399
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uncoincidentally, both of these companies were closely involved in financial
statement misrepresentations and intangibles paradigm business practices or
discourse. Despite the fact that board members have agreed to settlements out of
pocket, such settlements are in and of themselves unlikely to provide significant
behavioral incentives for board members to focus on clearing the intangibles
haze.402 This is because any behavioral incentives provided by such settlements
may be more than offset by the fact that board members may also profit from
misrepresentations of economic reality in financial statements and disclosures by
virtue of their stock ownership in the company making such representations.403
B.

Incorporating Intangibles in Financial Statements: Measuring the
Financial Impact of Intangibles

Current accounting practices and procedures as embodied in GAAP do not
adequately measure intangibles or sufficiently contemplate the implications of the
intangibles paradigm for existing measurements.404 Financial statements that
reflect greater recognition of the intangibles paradigm are a first step in
addressing the intangibles haze. The institutional structure of the accounting
profession and accounting regulation make changes in GAAP often contested and
difficult.405 This, combined with the fact that auditors and inside management
often engage in rent seeking behavior complicates any attempt to regulate
financial reporting and GAAP.406 Despite this fact, additional disclosure about
intangibles would improve the accuracy of financial statements’ representations
of economic reality and provide additional information that may help minimize
opportunities for fraud that currently exist with respect to intangibles paradigm
the settlement); Editorial, Directors on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8. 2005 (discussing WorldCom
settlement).
402
Lucian Bebchuk, What’s $13 Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005 (noting that
despite the Enron settlement, board members are not really being held accountable in any way
because the 10 directors, who sold Enron shares worth more than $250 million during the period
of Enron’s financial statement misrepresentations, are being permitted to pay 10 percent of such
directors’ pretax profits and keep the remaining 90 percent or $117 million).
403
Id.
404
See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2003) (“Orthodox
accounting does not apply well at all to intangibles like human and intellectual capital, or to the
new style methods of creating and selling products and services.”).
405
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1038 (“GAAP is a body of law structurally shielded from outside
inspection. Monitoring GAAP is difficult—to stay abreast of substantive issues in accounting is to
be a member of the guild in the first place.”).
406
Id. at 1026 (“Absent antecedent institutional reform that ensures auditor independence and
lessens the negative impact of rent-seeking and influence activity on audit quality, perverse effects
could follow”).
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discourse and company framing. This would in turn help make financial
statements more transparent and reliable.
As a first step to address the intangibles haze, companies should be required to
make additional financial reporting disclosures about intangibles under GAAP.407
Companies should be required to specifically identify and disclose, for example,
the principal intangible resources and assets they use, the implications and
significance of such intangibles and the potential consequences of loss of value
with respect to such intangibles. Disclosure should also be made concerning the
magnitude and specific nature of the contribution of intangibles to assets,
liabilities, revenues and expenses.
These disclosures should focus on four core aspects of the use of intangibles in
business operations: intangibles numbers, balance sheet impact, revenue impact
and expense effect. Such statements should demonstrate results over the same
time periods as GAAP requires with respect to company financial statements
generally.
The first aspect of such statements would be the disclosure of actual numbers
relating to intangibles. Companies should be required to give an overall picture of
the uses and role of intangibles in company operations. In addition, companies
should be required to specifically assess the financial statement impact of the
intangibles that they have disclosed. The balance sheet impact portion of the
intangibles financial statement would assess the financial reporting impact of
differential accounting treatment of intangibles. It would disclose how
capitalization as opposed to expensing intangibles would influence financial
reporting for the applicable periods. This would thus require sensitivity testing as
to the nature and impact of particular accounting choices with respect to
intangibles. For example, a company that has certain research and development
expenditures, would need to disclose with much more detail the specific nature of
such expenditures. Such disclosures would need to be balanced against
reasonable needs for companies to not disclose confidential or proprietary
information or trade secrets. In addition to disclosing greater information about
such expenditures, the company would be need to show the financial statement
impact of accounting decisions with respect to such expenditures. In the case of
research and development expenditures that were treated as operating expenses,
the company would need to show the balance sheet and income statement impact
if such expenditures were treated as capital expenses.
407

This proposal contemplates a separate intangibles financial statement. However, a separate
statement is not absolutely necessary, and the requirements for such a statement could be
incorporated into existing requirements for financial statements.
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In addition to disclosing more information about the nature of intangible
expenditures and the effects of treating such expenditures as capital or operating
expenses, companies should also be required to disclose the specific contribution
of intangibles to company revenues and expenses. This would mean, for
example, with respect to the research and development expenditures noted above,
that companies would need to disclose the revenue impact of the expenditures
associated with that particular intangibles expenses, regardless of whether an
intangible expense is treated as a capital or operating expense. Companies would
thus be required, for example, to disclose in far greater detail information about
both revenues and expenses in connection with research and development, which
is often currently reported as a line item in a company’s expenses on the income
statement.
In addition to greater disclosure with respect to intangibles, GAAP accounting
rules should be modified such as to minimize the differential treatment of tangible
and intangible assets. One proposal for dealing with the differential treatment of
tangible and intangible assets is to implement an accounting regime in which all
intangible investments with attributable benefits that have met certain feasibility
tests are recognized as assets.408 Selective capitalization of research and
development expenses may increase the usefulness of accounting measures both
statistically and economically.409 Studies suggest that a selective approach may
work better than any blanket policy with respect to treatment of expenses
associated with intangibles.410 An approach that includes specific measurements
and disclosure with regard to intangibles might also address some of the
408

See, e.g, Lev, supra note 18, at 124-125.
See Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson II, Evidence on the Usefulness of
Capitalizing and Amortizing Research and Development Costs (August 2000), Carnegie Mellon
University, Carnegie Mellon Accounting Mini-Conference, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=58661;
Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson II, Managerial Discretion and
Accounting for Research and Development Costs (December 2001), Working Paper, at
www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/Chambers.pdf.
410
See, e.g., Baruch Lev, Doron Nissim & Jacob Thomas, On The Informational Usefulness of
R&D Capitalization and Amortization (March 15, 2002), Working Paper (suggesting that policy
of treating research and development expenses as capital expenses would be beneficial), at
www.som.yale.edu/Faculty/jkt7/papers/r&d.pdf; S.P. Kothari, Ted E. Laguerre & Andrew J.
Leone, Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from
Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays (May 2001), Working Paper, at
http://web.mit.edu/kothari/www/attach/klR&D%20pap%20May%20%202001.pdf; Charles Shi,
On the Trade-off between the Future Benefits and Riskiness of R&D: A Bondholders’ Perspective,
35 J. ACCOUNTING ECON. & FIN. 227 (2003) (noting that from a bondholders’ perspective, the
variance effects or risk of research and development outweigh mean effects, suggesting that
bondholders see them as less like assets and more as useful measures of risk and indicating that
findings do not buttress FASB’s research and development expensing rule).
409
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distortions and discrepancies that have become characteristic of financial
statements under the intangibles paradigm.
Similar disclosures should be made in the aggregate for all intangibles as well as
individually for specifically identified intangibles such as research and
development expenses for specific projects or products, and intangibles whose
impairment could have an impact on the company’s operations or stock market
value. Such financial statement reporting requirements should be combined with
additional disclosure requirements for companies from a securities law
perspective.
C.

Intangibles Securities Disclosure Framework: Securities Regulation in the
Knowledge Economy

The intangibles paradigm presents significant challenges to existing securities
regulation frameworks that are based on an ethos of disclosure as a core aspect of
the operation of securities markets.411 Securities laws have developed under an
assumption that a continuous disclosure system helps ensure that securities
markets are fair and honest.412 The intangibles paradigm has contributed to
financial statement obfuscation and caused existing disclosures to vary at times
significantly from underlying economic reality. As a result a key question
presented by the intangibles paradigm from the perspective of securities laws is
how to incorporate greater and more focused disclosure about intangibles into
required company disclosures.413
An intangibles securities disclosure framework, which is a companion to the
intangibles financial statement reporting requirements discussed herein, represents
a potentially important step in incorporating greater recognition of intangibles
within existing securities frameworks. Current disclosure requirements with
respect to real property in Regulation S-K Items 102 are based upon assumptions

411

The legislative debate preceding passage of the Securities Act demonstrates that a primary
purpose of the Securities Act was to protect investors by providing them with clear and adequate
disclosure concerning securities they purchased. See 77 CONG. REC. 2910-2924 (1933).
412
Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 under the Securities Act of 1933—“Transactions by an Issuer
Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering,” Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1974 SEC
LEXIS 3297 (Apr. 23, 1974).
413
See Langevoort, supra note 404, at 1154 (noting that clearer and more focused disclosure
requirements will in general lessen the opportunity for “violation by rationalization” and may lead
to more careful attention by gatekeepers).
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about tangibles paradigm company operations. 414 Such requirements need to be
updated to reflect the reality of the intangibles paradigm. Since the SEC has
historically been at the forefront of enforcement of emerging accounting issues,415
specific SEC policies for intangibles would be of enormous value in setting
coherent standards for disclosure with respect to intangibles. In addition, the
institutional structure of the accounting profession makes regulatory intervention
from the SEC perspective all the more important.416
The implications of intangibles within existing securities law rules should also be
considered. Under existing securities law standards, companies take care in
making public disclosures about information contained in securities law filings.417
This means that a company would be unlikely, for example, to report financial
statement numbers in an SEC filing and then issue a press release with numbers
that are materially different than those in the SEC filing. Company disclosures
about intangibles are at times not currently rooted to the same extent within
existing securities law frameworks as are disclosures in other areas with respect to
tangible assets. This is clearly reflected in the operation of intangibles paradigm
discourse. One core element of intangibles paradigm discourse has been
assertions by companies with respect to intangibles about which no specific
disclosure may currently be required. This has been true in the case of fraudulent
disclosures such as those at Enron as well as informational disclosures by
companies such as Cisco with respect to its virtual operation.418 When
intangibles were less important, the current framework was perhaps manageable.
With the proliferation of intangibles and the advent of the knowledge economy,
more specific structures need to be developed for securities law disclosure
requirements about intangibles.

414

See Brookings Institution, Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Reporting SubGroup Report, at http://www.brook.edu/es/research/projects/intangibles/doc/sub_sec.htm
(hereinafter, “Brookings SEC Report”).
415
Ehsan H. Feroz, Kyungjoo Park & Victor S. Pastena, The Financial and Market Effects of the
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 107, 112 (1991)
(noting that SEC enforcement actions pursue issues that touch on integrity of the disclosure
system and emerging accounting problems).
416
Bratton, supra note 33, at 1039 (noting that unlike the legal profession, “with accounting the
advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients’ certified financials”).
417
The Rule 10b-5 standard, which imposes securities law liabilities for any untrue statement or
omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, is one reason companies often take
care in issuing public statements about items disclosed in SEC filings. See supra note 199.
418
See supra notes 138 to 157 and accompanying text.
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An intangibles securities law disclosure framework should begin with a
requirement that the Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operation (“MD&A”) portion of required securities law
disclosures includes a clear and detailed discussion of the role of intangibles
within a company.419 The imposition of aggregate disclosures has been one
recommendation made with respect to intangibles.420 Although aggregate
disclosures, including disclosures concerning market capitalization and book
value, are a step in the right direction, the focus of any intangibles disclosure
requirements should encompass the aggregate contribution of intangibles to
overall company operations, as well as the importance of individual intangibles
that are significant drivers of company value. This would mean more company
disclosure and warnings with respect to material future risks that are often at the
core of potential issues with intangibles paradigm business operations. Current
MD&A disclosure requirements in general and not just with respect to
intangibles, “fail to make sufficiently principled distinctions and hence collapses
into a muddle.”421 As a result, MD&A should move away from the current
“reasonably likely” standard embedded therein to a framework that will give
investors greater warning of both the probability and magnitude of material future
risks.422 Incorporating disclosure standards for intangibles in securities law
disclosure requirements is an important aspect of giving investors greater
understanding and warning of material future risks with respect to intangibles.
Such modifications of disclosure standards will represent the first step in moving
securities law frameworks in a direction that reflects operation of the intangibles
paradigm.

419

Item 303 of Regulation S-K sets forth the requirements for MD&A disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.303 (2005).
420
See Brookings SEC Report, supra note 414 (recommending that disclosures concerning
intangibles be made on an aggregate rather than individual basis and that disclosures about market
capitalization and book value be required).
421
Langevoort, supra note 404, at 1155.
422
Id. at 1155-1156.
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CONCLUSION
Breaking through the intangibles haze requires fundamental reassessment of
accounting rules and legal regimes in light of actual business practice in the
knowledge economy. It also involves recognition of motivations of various actors
that might be involved. Such motivations might include maintaining a high stock
price, personal gain, fraud or other factors. The fundamental question of how
intangibles should be treated in light of changing business practices remains an
open one about which many different legitimate approaches may exist under
current disclosure standards. Unfortunately, these legitimate differences create a
haze that also obscures illegitimate behavior such as Enron’s.
Current debates highlight the fact that accounting and disclosure standards with
respect to intangibles are increasingly important given the sources of value for the
majority of companies today. The fact that the treatment of intangibles is not
addressed and such major sources of value remain subject to differential
accounting treatment that makes financial statements less useful and often not
reflective of underlying economic reality. This tends to result in distortion of
behavioral incentives and financial measures of performance. To the extent that
intangibles are not adequately dealt with, a vacuum exists with respect to
companies’ use of intangibles that makes company framing and discourse much
harder to evaluate. The resulting haze is one that clearly needs to be addressed
from the perspective of applicable legal and accounting regimes intended to
govern business. Addressing this haze will require more that merely altering
particular rules or specific procedures, however. Rather, it necessitates a focus on
how to capture adequately contemporary business organization and practice in
financial statements and required securities law disclosure such as to reveal
information about companies that is relevant, material and representative of
underlying economic reality.
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